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Three things are to be helpt in conscience, 
Fraud, accident, and things of confidence.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy courts have frequently been characterized as courts of 
equity.2  Often this characterization has accompanied unusually relaxed 
interpretation or application of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code.3  At 
least since Aristotle, the term equity (epieikeia) can connote something like 
purposeful interpretation4 or mitigation of otherwise harsh results (mitigatio 
 1.  Attributed to Lord Chancellor Sir Thomas More (1478–1535).  See ANTHONY LAUSSAT, JR., 
AN ESSAY ON EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA 67 (1826).  A more modern formulation might read, 
“Three things are to be adjudicated in equity/Fraud, mistake, and breach of fiduciary duty.” 
 2.  Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (noting that bankruptcy courts apply “the 
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence”); see, e.g., Canino v. Bleau (In re Canino), 185 B.R. 
584, 594 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“[G]enerally, a failure to comply with bankruptcy rules may be 
excused by equitable doctrines.”).  But see Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a 
Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 
(2005) (“This Article will show that a bankruptcy judge has . . . no general equitable power.”).  
While the Supreme Court has never defined the scope of equity in bankruptcy, it has considered the 
interplay between equity and the specifics of the Bankruptcy Code in a number of cases.  See, e.g., 
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s 
equitable powers “must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
 3.  See, e.g., James Steven Rogers, Indeterminacy and the Law of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2011) (“Squishy. That’s been the rap on the law of restitution since before there 
even was a law of restitution.”). 
 4.  See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 133 (David Ross trans., Oxford 
World’s Classics ed. 1998) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while 
both are good the equitable is superior.  What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not 
the legally just but a correction of legal justice.  The reason is that all law is universal but about 
some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. . . .  And this is 
the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.”); see 
also Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (2001) (“[U]njust enrichment can be interpreted as a principle of 
Aristotelian equity, providing correction when normally sound rules produce unjust results in 
particular cases.”); Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to Particular Cases: A 
Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 
Winter 1996, at 263, 264 (“A full explanation of Aristotle’s and Pound’s writings demonstrates that 
a judge’s use of equity is a necessary and stabilizing feature of the application of universal laws to 
particular cases.  As such, equity does not invoke the mere vicissitudes of a judge’s conscience; 
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iuris).5  That is not, however, equity’s principal meaning when 
understanding the powers of courts of equity.6  Courts of equity historically 
applied the law of equity and, notwithstanding John Selden’s libel—equity is 
a roguish thing because its rules vary with the length of the chancellor’s 
foot7—equity in England was as “lawful” as the common law.8  The law of 
equity, like the common law, covered a large range of topics—trusts and 
estates, injunction, contracts, specific performance, unjust enrichment, 
restitution, and disgorgement.9  The law of equity was not limited to 
particular remedies.10  Like the common law, equity’s remedies 
encompassed money damages—but it also included many more.11  
Importantly, the law of equity was substantive as well as remedial; it 
recognized primary rights as well as secondary rights of rectification.12 
rather, equity accounts for the particular facts of any given situation and applies general laws to a 
specific case”). 
 5.  See J.B. MOYLE, IMPERATORIS IUSTINIANI INSTITUTIONUM: LIBRI QUATTUOR 29 (5th ed. 
1912) (identifying a new element in Roman law in the Digest of Justinian’s Corpus: aequitas 
(equity) as “mitigation of strict law in accordance with a sense of justice”).  See generally DANIEL R. 
COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 184, 191–95 
(2nd ed. 2004) (describing the classical, canonical, and humanistic origins of equity in England).  
The Western medieval tradition drew together both classical aspects of equity.  See, e.g., 3 THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-II, question 120, arts. 1 & 2 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Benzinger 1st complete American ed. 1948) (1274).  For contemporary 
“naturalized” accounts for equity culminating in restitution, see Mark P. Gergen, What Renders 
Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927, 1930 (2001) (“Under private law there is no obligation 
to share one’s good fortune with another person . . . .  In this respect the law of Restitution, like 
Contract and Tort law, is a matter of corrective justice.”); Lionel Smith, Restitution: The Heart of 
Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2115 (2001). 
 6.  See Rogers, supra note 3, at 1387 (discussing confusion created by use of the term equity to 
describe both fairness and the phenomenon of the legal system administered by the Courts of 
Equity). 
 7.  JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN 54–55 (2nd ed.1696) 
(“Equity is a Roguish Thing, for Law we have a Measure, know what to trust to, Equity is according 
to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity.  ‘Tis.all 
one as if they should make the Standard for the Measure, we call a Chancellor’s Foot, what an 
uncertain Measure would this be?  One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an 
indifferent Foot: ‘Tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s Conscience.”). 
 8.  See Zahnd, supra note 4, at 264 (“Equity does not vary with the length of the Chancellor’s 
foot.”); see also H. Brent McKnight, How Shall We Then Reason?  The Historical Setting of Equity, 
45 MERCER L. REV. 919 (1994) (describing the tumultuous pre-English Revolutionary setting in 
which Selden made his famed quip).  See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, 
in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). 
 9.  See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 
429, 437–52 (2003). 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See id. 
 12.  See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164 
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The idea of a “law of equity” jars the contemporary ear.  When not 
thinking of equity as epieikeia or mitigatio iuris, most lawyers, judges, and 
academics identify equity with remedies; the tail wagged by the dog of 
substantive law.  Remedies like injunction and specific performance 
comprise the bulk of the leading casebooks on equitable remedies.13  Equity 
as a subset of remedies dominates the contemporary conceptual landscape. 
If equity once boasted a substantial substantive content, what was it and 
why has it been reduced to remedies?  The answer to the first question is 
found in the title of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment.  Unjust (or unjustifiable) enrichment provides the conceptual 
core of this body of law.  As the converse of tort law, which identifies 
unjustified harms to another, unjust enrichment recognizes unjustified 
benefits to another, at least to the extent that they come at the claimant’s 
expense.  The answer to the second question—why equity has been reduced 
to remedies—is historical and pedagogical.  Historically, equity in America 
as an independent aspect of civil jurisdiction, often with separate courts, 
ceased to exist over the course of a century.  Anglo-American law abolished 
the writ system and merged courts of law and equity beginning with the 
Field Code in 1848 and culminating in Virginia in 2006.14  Pedagogically, 
American legal education has, over the course of the twentieth century, 
focused on a limited number of substantive fields of law to the exclusion of 
unjust enrichment—contributing to a lack of understanding of the law of 
equity.15 
Notwithstanding the merger of law and equity, and in spite of the long-
standing failure of law schools to teach the law of equity, in the mid-1990’s 
the American Law Institute appointed Andrew Kull as the reporter for the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE).16  With 
seven drafts completed and final approval received at the 2010 meeting of 
the American Law Institute,17 we can expect to see the R3RUE begin to 
(2007). 
 13.  See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(2011); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2010); 
RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (2010); 
EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005). 
 14.  See Laycock, supra note 12, at 171.  See generally KENT SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO VIRGINIA 
LAW/EQUITY REFORM AND OTHER LANDMARK CHANGES (2006). 
 15.  See Laycock, supra note 12, at 164 (describing evolution of “remedies” from its first 
identification with the forms of action in the nineteenth century to its use as a synonym for civil 
procedure in the first half of the twentieth century to the modern view of remedies as what a “court 
will do to correct or prevent the violation of legal rights that gives rise to liability”). 
 16.  See Andrew Kull, Three Restatements of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 867, 879–80 
(2011). 
 17.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) [hereinafter 
R3RUE]. 
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affect the legal landscape in the near future.18  It is that impending impact in 
bankruptcy that constitutes the burden of this article. 
Part II will briefly summarize the substantive law of equity as expressed 
in the R3RUE.  It will address the substantive core of law of equity that 
characterizes the concept of unjust enrichment.  Unjust enrichment is 
grounded in distinct categories of operative facts, such as: benefits conferred 
by mistake or without request, pursuant to a voidable contract, or as a result 
of wrongful interference with a claimant’s rights.  Part III will survey the 
remedial aspects of the R3RUE comprising the four so-called proprietary 
remedies—constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation, and the paired set 
of rescission and restitution.  In turn, Parts IV–VII will focus on each of 
these four remedies in greater depth and examine whether and how courts 
operating under bankruptcy law have applied them.  Part VIII concludes 
with some specific observations of how the R3RUE can and should affect 
the development of the law of equity in bankruptcy by firmly recognizing a 
place for certain of the proprietary remedies. 
II.  THE LAW OF EQUITY 
Tracking the original 1937 Restatement of Restitution,19 the R3RUE 
begins with the comprehensive statement that “[a] person who is unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.”20  The 
breadth of this assertion seems to belie any belief that there is a law of 
equity.  The phrase “unjustly enriched” could be construed to open the door 
to a judge’s free-floating moral inquiry into what is fair.21  The comments to 
section one of the R3RUE and the following sections make clear that this is 
not what unjust enrichment means.  “Unjust enrichment” is a term of art.  An 
 18.  See Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be 
Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247 (2004) (“After a long period of decline, restitution—the 
body of law dealing with benefit-based liability or benefit-based recovery—is finally making a 
comeback in the American legal landscape.” (footnote omitted)). 
 19.  The full title was the LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI-CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUSTS (1937).  See generally Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of 
Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (2005) [hereinafter Kull, James Barr Ames] 
(describing history of the intellectual impetus for this first Restatement). 
 20.  R3RUE § 1. 
 21.  Kull, James Barr Ames, supra note 19, at 318 (“[T]here were some who feared that the 
natural choice for a title would be misunderstood; that if it published a ‘Restatement of Unjust 
Enrichment,’ the American Law Institute would [be] seen as endorsing an open-ended charter of 
liability, to be invoked in any case where ‘enrichment’ and ‘injustice’ might be thought to 
coincide.”). 
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early comment in the R3RUE observes that the “concern of restitution” is 
not with unjust enrichment in the broad, moral sense but with the “narrower 
set of circumstances giving rise to what might more appropriately be called 
unjustified enrichment.”22  Unjust enrichment as expressed in the R3RUE is 
not the application of the untrammeled conscience of a judge or jury, but 
rather the shorthand expression of a finite set of legally cognizable claims. 
Claims sounding in unjust enrichment arose historically in both law and 
equity.23  One branch of restitution for unjust enrichment can be traced to 
claims at law called quasi-contract and the common counts.24  The other 
principal antecedent of claims for unjust enrichment can be found in the 
remedies fashioned by courts of equity.25  As described below, however, the 
challenges of applying the remedies for unjust enrichment in bankruptcy 
arise from the equitable side of the field, not the legal.26 
Persons are regularly enriched by many activities that do not render 
retention unjust.  For example, some years ago I lived next door to a 
wonderful percussionist and was greatly enriched by listening to him play a 
variety of instruments.  Retention of that enrichment without payment was 
not unjust.  What makes the retention of certain benefits unjust is the lack of 
a recognized legal basis.  “To be the subject of a claim in restitution, the 
benefit conferred must be something in which the claimant has a legally 
protected interest, and it must be acquired or retained in a manner that the 
law regards as unjustified.”27  Thus, it is generally the case that benefits 
wrongfully obtained are unjustly retained.  Gains obtained by fraud or 
duress are obvious examples.  Yet, even when receipt of benefits is not 
wrongful, retention of certain benefits non-consensually received may be 
unjust.  Benefits received by mistake are the paradigmatic example.  
Listening to music over the fence was neither wrongful nor unjust. 
Section two of the R3RUE describes these limiting principles in broad 
brush: “[t]he fact that a recipient has obtained a benefit without paying for it 
does not of itself establish that the recipient has been unjustly enriched.”28  
For example, “[a] valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to 
 22.  R3RUE § 1 cmt. b. 
 23.  Id. § 4 cmt. b. 
 24.  See Peter Birks, Restitution for Wrongs, in UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 171, 177–91 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 1995). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See infra Part III. 
 27.  R3RUE § 2 cmt. b.  The same comment goes on to observe that “the fact that we derive 
advantage from the efforts and expenditures of others is not ‘unjust enrichment’ but one of the 
advantages of civilization.”  Indeed, such a voluntary sharing of benefits is one of the very means by 
which humanity reaches its end or purpose.  See C. Scott Pryor, Principled Pluralism and Contract 
Remedies, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 723, 742–43 (2009). 
 28.  R3RUE § 2(1). 
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matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust 
enrichment.”29  Deferring to recognized forms of exchange, restitution 
recognizes the superiority of contract’s ex ante value-setting function over a 
court’s reexamination efforts even if, in retrospect, the values exchanged are 
substantially disproportionate.30  Similarly, a claim in unjust enrichment 
generally cannot be used to foist an exchange on an unwilling party.31  But 
for certain emergencies, foregoing an opportunity to contract will defeat a 
claim of unjust enrichment. 
Chapters 2–6 of the R3RUE classify the factual circumstances or 
predicates that have been recognized in American common law as 
amounting to unjustified enrichment.32  Thus, Chapter 2 (sections 5–19) 
addresses situations where the claimant confers a benefit involuntarily, e.g., 
by mistake,33 as a result of fraud,34 duress,35 or the exercise of undue 
influence,36 while incapacitated,37 or by one without of authority.38  Chapter 
3 (sections 20–30) deals with unrequested benefits obtained without a prior 
agreement to pay, e.g., protecting another’s life, health,39 or property;40 
performing the duties of another person;41 performing a joint obligation42 
(and sometimes even performing another’s independent obligation43); and 
 29.  See id. § 2(2).  So too, a gift: “A valid gift is not a source of unjust enrichment . . . .”  Id. § 2 
cmt. b. 
 30.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (“If the requirement of 
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . (b) equivalence in the values 
exchanged . . . .”). 
 31.  See R3RUE § 2(4) (“Liability in restitution may not subject an innocent recipient to a forced 
exchange: in other words, an obligation to pay for a benefit that the recipient should have been free 
to refuse.”). 
 32.  See id. at chs. 2–6. 
 33.  See R3RUE § 5 (“Invalidating Mistake”); see infra Appendix A.  Sections 6–12 of the 
R3RUE lay out with specificity the methods of invalidating mistakes that are regularly recognized 
by the courts. 
 34.  See R3RUE § 13 (“Fraud and Misrepresentation”); see infra Appendix A. 
 35.  See R3RUE § 14 (“Duress”); see infra Appendix A. 
 36.  See R3RUE § 15 (“Undue Influence”); see infra Appendix A. 
 37.  See R3RUE § 16 (“Incapacity of Transferor”); see infra Appendix A. 
 38.  See R3RUE § 17 (“Lack of Authority”); see infra Appendix A. 
 39.  See R3RUE § 20 (“Protection of Another’s Life or Health”); see infra Appendix A. 
 40.  See R3RUE § 21 (“Protection of Another’s Property”); see infra Appendix A. 
 41.  See R3RUE § 22 (“Performance of Another’s Duty”); see infra Appendix A. 
 42.  See R3RUE § 23 (“Performance of a Joint Obligation (Indemnity and Contribution)”); see 
infra Appendix A. 
 43.  See R3RUE § 24 (“Performance of an Independent Obligation (Equitable Subrogation)”); 
see infra Appendix A. 
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providing property or services as part of a cohabiting relationship.44  In 
Chapter 4 (sections 31–39), the R3RUE deals with the restoration of benefits 
conferred pursuant to a voidable contract, e.g., as a result of an agreement’s 
indefiniteness or the parties’ failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds;45 
when a contract is illegal or otherwise violates public policy;46 where the 
recipient of contract benefits is incompetent;47 where a contract has been 
discharged because of mistake or impracticability;48 or where a material 
breacher has provided contract benefits to the other party.49  Chapter 5 
(sections 40–45) addresses cases where one party has received benefits 
through wrongful interference with the rights of the claimant, e.g., by 
trespass,50 misappropriation,51 infringement,52 breach of fiduciary duty,53 or 
homicide.54  Finally, the R3RUE concludes its description of examples of 
unjustified enrichment with a set of residual cases in Chapter 6 (sections 46–
48).55  The organizing rubrics animating the chapters of the R3RUE are to 
some extent arbitrary.56  Yet the principles and rules of the R3RUE provide a 
far more serviceable result than the first Restatement of Restitution.  In large 
part, it is because of the R3RUE’s clarity that it can be expected to have an 
impact on the jurisprudence of bankruptcy courts. 
III.  EQUITY’S PROPRIETARY REMEDIES 
The remedial provisions of the R3RUE compose Chapter 7.57  
Prominent among them are the quartet of constructive trusts,58 equitable 
liens,59 subrogation,60 and the paired set of rescission and restitution61—what 
 44.  See R3RUE § 28 (“Unmarried Cohabitants”); see infra Appendix A. 
 45.  See R3RUE § 31 (“Unenforceability”); see infra Appendix A. 
 46.  See R3RUE § 32 (“Illegality”); see infra Appendix A. 
 47.  See R3RUE § 33 (“Incapacity of Recipient”); see infra Appendix A. 
 48.  See R3RUE § 34 (“Mistake or Supervening Change of Circumstances”); see infra Appendix 
A. 
 49.  See R3RUE § 36 (“Restitution to a Party in Default”); see infra Appendix A. 
 50.  See R3RUE § 40 (“Trespass, Conversion, and Comparable Wrongs”); see infra Appendix A. 
 51.  See R3RUE § 41 (“Misappropriation of Financial Assets”); see infra Appendix A. 
 52.  See R3RUE § 42 (“Interference with Intellectual Property and Similar Rights”); see infra 
Appendix A. 
 53.  See R3RUE § 43 (“Fiduciary or Confidential Relation”); see infra Appendix A. 
 54.  See R3RUE §§ 45–46. 
 55.  See id. §§ 46–48. 
 56.  See, e.g., Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law 
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487 (2007). 
 57.  See R3RUE ch. 7. 
 58.  See R3RUE § 55 (“Constructive Trust”); see infra Appendix A.  See infra Part IV. 
 59.  See R3RUE § 56 (“Equitable Lien”); see infra Appendix A.  See infra Part V. 
 60.  See R3RUE § 57 (“Subrogation as a Remedy”); see infra Appendix A.  See infra Part VI. 
 61.  See R3RUE § 54 (“Rescission and Restitution”); see infra Appendix A.  See infra Part VII. 
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the R3RUE refers to collectively as rights to “restitution via rights in 
identifiable property.”62  More simply, each of these can be called 
proprietary remedies.  Of additional significance in the event of insolvency 
is section 60 of the R3RUE,63 which articulates a rule of priority to resolve 
conflicts between the claimant to a proprietary remedy and a creditor who 
holds an unsecured claim.64  And of significance in all cases are the tracing 
rules of sections 58 and 59 of the R3RUE, as well as the defenses described 
in Chapter 8.65 
More than the substantive bases of unjust enrichment, the proprietary 
remedies play a significant role in bankruptcy.66  If recognized in an 
insolvency proceeding, proprietary remedies effectively remove property 
from the estate and thus reduce what is available for other creditors.67  Two 
leading policies typical of all forms of insolvency law may thus appear to 
conflict.  On the one hand, the principle of pari passu requires that all 
similarly-situated creditors of a debtor be accorded equal treatment.68  On the 
other, the nature of property prohibits satisfaction of the claims of creditors 
with property belonging to someone other than the debtor.69  For simplicity, 
this can be characterized as the principle of property. 
 62.  R3RUE § 54 cmt. a. 
 63.  Id. § 60 (“Priority”); see infra Appendix A. 
 64.  R3RUE § 60. 
 65.  See, e.g., id. § 62 (“No Unjust Enrichment”); id. § 63 (“Unclean Hands”); id. § 64 (“Passing 
On”); id. § 65 (“Change of Position”); id. § 66 (“Bona Fide Purchaser”); id. § 67 (“Bona Fide 
Payee”); id. § 70 (“Laches”).  These defenses to claims for restitution are traditionally cast as 
affirmative defenses, but they could equally as well be understood to traverse an element of 
claimant’s substantive claim. 
 66.  See generally Anthony Duggan, Proprietary Remedies in Insolvency: A Comparison of the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment with English and Commonwealth Law, 68 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229 (2011) (discussing the role of proprietary remedies in bankruptcy). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property 
and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 309 (1999) (“The first of these principles, which I call the 
‘pari passu principle,’ provides that unsecured creditors rank equally with each other in right to 
payment, regardless of the temporal order in which they extend credit . . . .”).  See also Pepper v. 
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“The mere fact that an officer, director, or stockholder has a claim 
against his bankrupt corporation or that he has reduced that claim to judgment does not mean that the 
bankruptcy court must accord it pari passu treatment with the claims of other creditors.  Its 
disallowance or subordination may be necessitated by certain cardinal principles of equity 
jurisprudence.”). 
 69.  See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135–36 (1962) (“The Bankruptcy Act 
simply does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people’s property among a bankrupt’s 
creditors.” (footnote omitted)). 
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What constitutes a claim is rarely at issue in matters involving unjust 
enrichment; bankruptcy courts have little difficulty in allowing claims that 
are described under the substantive rules of the R3RUE.70  But, what 
constitutes “property of another” has proved problematic.71  The fuzzy edge 
of what constitutes property, particularly the effects of the quartet of 
proprietary remedies, has troubled American bankruptcy courts. 
Anthony Duggan aptly characterizes the source of the “property 
problem” when he observes that the distinction between personal and 
proprietary rights in a common law system “is not a straightforward exercise 
because equity blurs the boundaries.”72  With regard to the principle of pari 
passu, the treatment of claims arising under the rubrics of contract and tort 
has presented some significant challenges.73  With regard to the principle of 
property,74 courts have been careful to ensure that creditors’ claims are not 
satisfied with property to which the debtor does not hold legal title.75  Yet, 
these challenges pale in comparison to the conceptual variations and outright 
contradictions that courts express when addressing questions of equitable 
title.76  Whether courts choose to follow or reject the R3RUE, its relevant 
remedial sections offer a resource to correct misstatements of the law,77 and, 
what’s more, provide an analytic framework by which to evaluate the 
competing principles of insolvency law. 
IV.  CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
A.  From Equity 
The most potent of the proprietary remedies is the constructive trust.78  
As with all proprietary remedies, constructive trust “supplement[s] the 
 70.  See supra text accompanying notes 33–54. See also the broad definition of “claim” in the 
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
 71.  See Duggan, supra note 66, at 1232. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (concluding that assets held in ERISA-
qualified pension plan were not property of the estate). 
 74.  A debtor’s bankruptcy estate is composed of the debtor’s legal and equitable interests in 
property as of the commencement of the case.  11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).  The estate may also be 
enhanced by the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Id. §§ 544–48.  These provisions 
permit the avoidance of certain pre-bankruptcy transfers that effectively reduce the amount available 
for distribution to unsecured creditors.  Broadly speaking, these powers go beyond the common law 
to augment the legal and equitable interests of the debtor that existed at the filing of bankruptcy. 
 75.  See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 76.  See Duggan, supra note 66, at 1251, 1267 (discussing court decisions concerning equitable 
title). 
 77.  See infra text accompanying notes 93–114. 
 78.  See discussion supra Part III. 
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personal liability of the defendant with significant rights in rem.”79  In two 
parts, section 55 of the R3RUE provides that: 
 (1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title 
to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation 
of the claimant’s rights, the defendant may be declared a 
constructive trustee, for the benefit of the claimant, of the property 
in question and its traceable product. 
 (2) The obligation of a constructive trustee is to surrender the 
constructive trust property to the claimant, on such conditions as the 
court may direct.80 
Application of the remedy of constructive trust is triggered only when 
one of the substantive bases of unjust enrichment described in Part I has 
been established: the first step is to establish that the recipient has been 
unjustly enriched by the acquisition of specific property, the test of unjust 
enrichment being found in the applicable rules of Chapters 2–6.81  
Notwithstanding broad judicial language,82 the decision to impose a 
constructive trust on property is not the application of a court’s moral 
judgment.83  The legal rights for which the remedy of constructive trust may 
be appropriate are limited to those cases of unjustified enrichment 
recognized by the law, whether common law or equity or both.84 
The substantive predicate of unjust enrichment is only one of two 
required for the remedy of constructive trust.  The second predicate concerns 
the nature of the unjust enrichment: it must entail the acquisition of title to 
identifiable property.85  Simply enhancing the value of another’s assets is 
 79.  R3RUE pt. III, ch. 7, Introductory Note (2011). 
 80.  R3RUE § 55. 
 81.  Id. § 55 cmt. a (“The first step is to establish that the defendant is liable in restitution by one 
of the substantive provisions of this Restatement.  The second is to show that the transaction that is 
the source of the liability is one in which the defendant acquired specifically identifiable property.  If 
the property the claimant seeks to recover via constructive trust is a substitute for the property 
originally acquired by the defendant, its continued identification depends on the tracing rules of §§ 
58 and 59.”). 
 82.  See, e.g., Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919), 
superseded by statute, as stated in Israel v. Chabra, 906 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 2009). 
 83.  R3RUE § 1 cmt. b (“[T]he law of restitution is very far from imposing liability for every 
instance of what might plausibly be called unjust enrichment.”). 
 84.  See id. § 4 (“Restitution May Be Legal or Equitable or Both”); see infra Appendix A. 
 85.  See id. § 55 cmt. f (“Assuming that the defendant is indeed liable to the claimant on a 
restitution theory, constructive trust is not an available remedy unless the transaction that gives rise 
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insufficient to ground a claim in constructive trust (although it may be 
enough for an equitable lien86).  Even proof of a causal relationship between 
enriching actions and increased value of a specific item of defendant’s 
property is insufficient; one who seeks a constructive trust must prove that 
the defendant acquired legal title to the identified asset as a result of the 
unjust enrichment.87 
Demonstrating the presence of unjust enrichment and acquisition of title 
to identifiable property defines the universe of substantive predicates for 
constructive trust in the two-party scenario.88  But how should the law 
resolve the implications of the presence of a third party, e.g., unsecured 
creditors of an insolvent defendant?  When, if ever, should the unjust 
enrichment claimant be entitled to assert constructive trust in identifiable 
property against a debtor’s other creditors?  While the second element of the 
claim—the debtor’s acquisition of title to identifiable property—remains the 
same, the claimant must additionally establish that the debtor’s creditors will 
be unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense in order to obtain a 
constructive.89  In short, the debtor should not be able to rob Peter to pay 
Paul.90 
to liability is one in which the defendant acquires ownership of the trust property.”); see also id. § 55 
illus. 14 (“Son works in Father’s business at a nominal salary, relying on Father’s oral promise that 
on Father’s 75th birthday (still several years distant) he will transfer to Son a 50% share in the 
business.  On reaching the age of 75, Father repudiates his promise, which is unenforceable under 
the Statute of Frauds.  Son has a claim in restitution to recover the amount, if any, by which the 
market value of his services exceeds the salary he has received (§ 31).  Son would prefer that the 
court declare Father a constructive trustee for his benefit of a 50 percent interest in the business.  The 
remedy is unavailable because the transaction by which Father was unjustly enriched was not the 
source of Father’s title to identifiable property.”). 
 86.  See infra text accompanying notes 175–85. 
 87.  See R3RUE § 55 illus. 15.  Illustration 15 presents the same facts as Illustration 14, except 
that the court finds that the value of particular assets in Father’s business has been significantly 
enhanced by Son’s efforts.  Id.  While this relationship of cause and effect does not entitle Son to 
claim a share of ownership via constructive trust, it satisfies the requirements of section 56 R3RUE 
for the remedy of equitable lien.  Id.  The court might therefore grant Son an equitable lien on the 
assets in question, to secure Son’s unjust enrichment claim against Father.  Id.; see also supra text 
accompanying note 85. 
 88.  See supra notes 85–87. 
 89.  See R3RUE § 55 cmt. d. 
 90.  Id. (“Priority in this three-way contest may be explained without reference to formal notions 
of title.  Even if A’s suit for restitution is formally asserted against B as defendant, A’s implicit 
claim—to justify in equitable terms the remedy of constructive trust—is that B’s unsecured creditor 
C will be unjustly enriched, at A’s expense, if B’s debt to C is satisfied from assets that B obtained 
from A by fraud.  The intuitive objection is that a debtor should not be allowed to rob Peter to pay 
Paul.”). 
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B.  Into Bankruptcy 
The oft-repeated refrain that bankruptcy courts are not roving 
commissions to do equity91 has obscured what it is that bankruptcy courts 
are to do with the law of equity.  Confusion reigns among equity as 
epieikeia, equity as mitigatio iuris, equity as the basis of substantive rights, 
and equity as the source of certain remedies.92  Nowhere is this confusion 
better demonstrated than in the treatment of constructive trust in bankruptcy. 
1.  Recognition 
The relationship in bankruptcy between the proprietary remedy of 
constructive trust and the claims of general creditors has been bubbling at 
the surface since the 1994 decision in In re Omegas Group, Inc.93  The Sixth 
Circuit concluded that with few exceptions a bankruptcy court could not 
impose a constructive trust on assets of the bankruptcy estate.94  Unless there 
had been a final judgment imposing a constructive trust before the 
bankruptcy filing, virtually no facts would warrant the imposition of one 
afterward.95  The court asserted that a constructive trust is “anathema” to 
bankruptcy because it violates the principle of pari passu.96  That a 
proprietary remedy might vindicate the principle of property received short 
shrift because, according to the court, “[a] constructive trust is a legal 
fiction, a common-law remedy in equity that may only exist by the grace of 
judicial action.”97  The court justified its failure to substantiate this 
conclusion with only cursory reference to the law of Kentucky with the 
 91.  See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 661 (5th Cir. 2010); see also 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374–75 (2007) (analyzing limited scope of 
equitable power under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006)). 
 92.  See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
 93.  XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 94.  Id. at 1452. 
 95.  Id. at 1449. 
Unless a court has already impressed a constructive trust upon certain assets or a 
legislature has created a specific statutory right to have particular kinds of funds held as if 
in trust, the claimant cannot properly represent to the bankruptcy court that he was, at the 
time of the commencement of the case, a beneficiary of a constructive trust held by the 
debtor. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 96.  Id. at 1452 (“Constructive trusts are anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since they take 
from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not from the offending debtor.”). 
 97.  Id. at 1449. 
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remarkable comment that “just because something is so under state law does 
not necessarily make it so under the Bankruptcy Code.”98 
Andrew Kull responded four years later with a lengthy article attacking 
the Omegas decision.99  Rather than reviewing Kull’s critique, this article 
will focus on how the facts and law reported in Omegas would be analyzed 
under the R3RUE.  The first question is whether Omegas, the debtor, was 
unjustly enriched at the expense of claimant Datacomp.  In other words, do 
the facts identified by the court support any of the substantive bases for 
unjust enrichment described in the R3RUE?  According to the Sixth 
Circuit’s version of the facts, Datacomp and the debtor Omegas entered into 
an arrangement to finance Omegas’s purchase of IBM computers in 
violation of Omegas’s (and Datacomp’s) existing contracts with IBM.100  
Under their agreement, Datacomp ordered computers from Omegas and 
prepaid for them.101  However, it never received the computers because 
Omegas subsequently cancelled its orders from IBM while keeping 
Datacomp’s payments, and then filed bankruptcy.102  Datacomp brought an 
adversary action asserting that Omegas had obtained payment for the 
computers from Datacomp by fraud and asking the court to impose a 
constructive trust on the amounts so paid.103 
Section 13 of the R3RUE states that “[a] transfer induced by fraud . . . is 
subject to rescission.”104  Indeed, contract law has long provided that a 
defrauded party has the power to avoid a contract induced by fraud.105  The 
facts found by the bankruptcy court, however, do not clearly indicate fraud 
 98.  Id. at 1450.  The court’s failure to cite the leading Supreme Court decision is telling.  See 
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by state 
law.  Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests 
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”). 
 99.  Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 265 (1998).  Kull was also the Reporter for the R3RUE.  But see Rogers, supra note 3, 
at 1404–05 (criticizing Kull’s conclusions with respect to the effect of tracing rules extending 
priority of a proprietary claimant to proceeds). 
 100.  Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1445–46.  Omegas had reached its credit limit with IBM’s financing arm 
and was in danger of financial collapse.  Id. at 1445.  Rather than purchasing directly from IBM as it 
ordinarily had done, Datacomp agreed not only to buy IBM computers from Omegas but to pay for 
them in advance of delivery.  Id. at 1446.  Fortified with the prepayments from Datacomp, Omegas 
was to pay down its line of credit with IBM and continue in business.  Id.  Of course, it ultimately 
did neither. 
 101.  Id. at 1446. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See R3RUE § 13 (2011). 
 105.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) (“When a Misrepresentation 
Makes a Contract Voidable: 1) If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent 
or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the 
contract is voidable by the recipient.”). 
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by Omegas; both parties went in with their eyes wide open.106  Additionally, 
the extensive performance under the contract substantially weakens any 
claim for rescission and restitution; by the time of bankruptcy it was too late 
to unscramble the egg.107  In brief, the facts in Omegas would not have 
warranted rescission by Datacomp even had Omegas never filed bankruptcy. 
However, even if Omegas defrauded Datacomp, the nature of 
Datacomp’s performance—payment of money to Omegas—is not the sort 
for which a proprietary remedy like constructive trust is appropriate.  
Constructive trust is a remedy for unjust enrichment by which the defendant 
acquires “legal title to specifically identifiable property,”108 not one by which 
it receives fungible funds.109  In addition, the majority in Omegas ignored the 
tracing issues raised by the commingling of Datacomp’s payments with 
other funds in Omegas bank account.110  Given the cash-poor nature of most 
debtors immediately before bankruptcy, the lowest intermediate balance in 
Omegas bank account would likely have been zero.  Finally, while the court 
mentions the doctrine of unclean hands,111 it fails to explain that the law of 
equity consistently bars a claimant from a proprietary remedy when it too 
engaged in inequitable conduct.112  The facts in Omegas never warranted a 
constructive trust for Datacomp. 
In its haste to expunge constructive trust from bankruptcy, the Sixth 
Circuit failed to take seriously the law of equity.  That law, summarized in 
the R3RUE, suggests that Omegas was not unjustly enriched at Datacomp’s 
 106.  Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1446.  On the one hand, the trial court found that “Datacomp entered 
into the agreement . . . as ‘in a sense a joint venture’ . . . .”  Id.  On the other, Omegas continued to 
invoice Datacomp for computers even after it had cancelled the corresponding orders from IBM.  Id.  
The bankruptcy court applied a constructive trust only to payments received by Omegas after 
cancellation—even though that time was well after the parties entered into their contract.  Id. 
 107.  See infra text accompanying notes 330–52. 
 108.  See R3RUE § 55 cmt. a. 
 109.  See supra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
 110.  See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1454 (Guy, J., concurring) (“The trustee emphasizes that . . . 
Omegas commingled Datacomp’s money with over $1,600,000 of money it received from other 
sources.”).  Section 59 of the R3RUE provides for the typical lowest intermediate balance test 
tracing rule in such a situation.  R3RUE § 59 (“Tracing into or Through a Commingled Fund”); see 
infra Appendix A.  The First Circuit has applied this rule to deny application of a constructive trust 
where unjustly obtained funds had been completely dissipated.  See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 111.  See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1448 (“Omegas also argues that the fishy nature of Datacomp’s 
attempt to keep getting IBM computers at a favorable rate through Omegas’s still-valid IR 
agreement renders Datacomp’s hands ‘unclean,’ thus preventing it from seeking the equitable 
remedy of constructive trust.”). 
 112.  See R3RUE § 63 (“Equitable Disqualification (Unclean Hands)”); see infra Appendix A. 
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expense and that, even if it were, neither the right of rescission nor the 
remedy of constructive trust was warranted.  Subsequent decisions by the 
Sixth Circuit113 and lower courts114 in the Sixth Circuit suggest a quiet stand-
down from the broad assertion in Omegas that there can be no constructive 
trusts in bankruptcy.  Nonetheless, the Omegas opinion privileges the 
principle of pari passu at the expense of the principle of property. 
Other circuit courts have been more lenient in permitting application of 
constructive trust in bankruptcy.  Applying New Jersey law, the Second 
Circuit blessed the application of a constructive trust on a debtor’s inventory 
of air conditioners stored in New Jersey in violation of its security 
agreement.115  In contrast with the opinion in Omegas that would have 
denied a constructive trust even for fraud,116 Howard’s Appliance found 
sufficient grounds for constructive trust upon little more than breach of 
contract.117  The R3RUE would not countenance a proprietary remedy on the 
facts of Howard’s Appliance.118  Without a valid substantive claim of unjust 
enrichment, there is no predicate for a constructive trust.  Fifteen years later 
the Second Circuit cut back on the over-breadth of Howard’s Appliance in 
 113.  See, e.g., Poss v. Morris (In re Morris), 260 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding relief from 
automatic stay appropriate to permit existing state court action to determine whether claimant had 
enforceable claim from conveyance of property pursuant to settlement agreement to proceed to 
judgment with substantive references to relevant Ohio law of unjust enrichment); Kitchen v. Boyd 
(In re Newpower), 233 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining bankruptcy court erred by holding that 
embezzled funds were property of the bankruptcy estate but was correct to reject application of 
constructive trust to their proceeds); McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (holding wife’s interest in husband’s award by state court was a constructive trust and not 
a debt dischargeable in husband’s bankruptcy). 
 114.  See, e.g., SCS Gen. Contractors, Inc. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (In re Barnhill’s Buffet, 
Inc.), 421 B.R. 602, No. 07–08948, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4335 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009); Whitmore 
Lake Pub. Schs. v. CMC Telecom, Inc. (In re CMC Telecom, Inc.), 383 B.R. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2008); Corzin v. Decker, Vonau, Sybert & Lackey, Co. (In re Simms Constr. Servs. Co.), 311 B.R. 
479 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004). 
 115.  Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard’s Appliance Corp. (In re Howard’s Appliance Corp.), 874 F.2d 
88 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 116.  See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1451 (“We think that § 541(d) simply does not permit a claimant in 
the position of Datacomp to persuade the bankruptcy court to impose the remedy of constructive 
trust for alleged fraud committed against it by the debtor . . . .”). 
 117.  See Howard’s Appliance Corp.,874 F.2d at 94 (“Howard must have known that, under the 
terms of the security agreement, it was obligated to keep its Sanyo merchandise at its Nassau County 
location, and that by storing its inventory in New Jersey, it would frustrate Sanyo’s interest in those 
goods.”).  The debtor’s relocation of its inventory from New York to New Jersey caused perfection 
of Sanyo’s security interest to lapse under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as it then 
existed.  See id. at 91 n.3.  Today under revised Article 9, with respect to a corporate debtor, Sanyo’s 
security interest would attach and remain perfected regardless of the location of the inventory.  See 
U.C.C. §§ 9–301, 9–307 (2010). 
 118.  See supra text accompanying notes 33–54 (identifying cases of unjust enrichment) and 338–
40 (observing that application of a proprietary remedy is inappropriate where parties have 
voluntarily entered into subsisting contracts). 
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First Central Financial.119  First Central Financial involved a breach of an 
agreement for the allocation of tax refunds between a parent and subsidiary 
corporation.120  Though the court correctly observed that “a constructive trust 
is an equitable remedy intended to be ‘fraud-rectifying’ rather than ‘intent-
enforcing,’”121 it went on to comment in dicta that the principle of pari passu 
provided an additional reason not to find a constructive trust in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.122 
The Third and Fourth Circuits have applied the law of equity in a 
straightforward way to recognize the constructive trust remedy when 
founded on an instance of unjust enrichment.  In Columbia Gas,123 the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required the debtor to collect 
refunds from gas suppliers and rebate them to customers,124 as well as to 
collect research surcharges from customers and turn them over to a federally 
designated non-profit entity that researched production and transportation of 
natural gas.125  Columbia Gas was a mere conduit.  Even the Sixth Circuit 
would probably have held that the debtor had no interest in these funds.126  In 
any event, the Third Circuit held that both were excluded from the 
bankruptcy estate.127  It then applied the lowest intermediate balance test128 to 
 119.  Superintendent of Ins. for N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 120.  Id. at 211 (“FCFC is the parent corporation of FCIC, a New York insurance company.  In 
the 1980s, the two companies executed a tax allocation agreement . . . which prescribed how tax 
charges and refunds were to be apportioned between FCFC and FCIC.”). 
 121.  Id. at 216 (quoting Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc’y v. Shakerdge, 49 N.Y.2d 939, 940 (N.Y. 
1980)). 
 122.  Id. at 217 (“The tension between constructive trust law and bankruptcy law is another reason 
to proceed with caution. . . .  [O]ur obligation to apply New York constructive trust law does not 
diminish the need to ‘act very cautiously’ to minimize conflict with the goals of the Bankruptcy 
Code.” (citations omitted)). 
 123.  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In re Columbia Gas Sys. 
Inc.), 997 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 124. Id. at 1053 (“Pursuant to Order 528, five upstream pipelines that supplied gas to Columbia 
filed new rate schedules which allocated $134 million less in buyout or buydown costs to Columbia 
than under the purchase deficiency method.  Columbia, in turn, filed tariff provisions with FERC to 
flow through these refunds to its downstream customers.  These refunds, together with 
approximately $26 million in refunds arising from other overcharges for gas and transportation 
services, comprise the customer refunds that Columbia seeks to exclude from its bankruptcy estate 
and pay to its customers.”). 
 125.  Id. (“GRI is financed predominantly through FERC-approved surcharges on gas delivered 
through regulated pipelines.  Pursuant to this regulatory mechanism, each pipeline, including 
Columbia, collects a separately identified charge from its customers and then remits this money to 
GRI within fifteen days.”). 
 126.  See supra note 95. 
 127.  Columbia Gas, 997 F.2d at 1062 (“[W]e hold that the customer refunds already received and 
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trace the amount of funds held in constructive trust and limit recovery by the 
putative beneficiaries.129  Conversely, collection of unpaid amounts owed by 
Columbia to its suppliers, even though ultimately paid by Columbia’s 
customers, was not enhanced by an administrative order and was thus purely 
contractual and not entitled to a constructive trust.130  In Mid Atlantic 
Supply,131 the Fourth Circuit applied the “mere conduit” reasoning to a check 
jointly payable to a subcontractor and supplier for the purchase of 
materials.132  The subcontractor would be unjustly enriched by mistake, 
according to the court, if it were allowed to retain the check.  Sections 7133 
and 8134 of the R3RUE support this conclusion.  Under the circumstances of 
the parties’ agreement, retention of possession of the check by the 
subcontractor would be a mistake because an unintended payee would end 
up with the money.135  And constructive trust was an appropriate remedy for 
the unjust enrichment that would have resulted from such a mistake.136 
The Fifth,137 Seventh,138 Ninth,139 and Eleventh140 Circuits have also 
recognized that claims based on unjust enrichment can be remedied by 
those to be received are excluded from Columbia’s bankruptcy estate . . . .  The argument for the 
GRI surcharges being held in trust is even stronger than the argument for the customer 
refunds . . . .”). 
 128.  See id. at 1060. 
 129. Columbia Gas, 997 F.2d. at 1064 (“When Columbia filed for bankruptcy, the $3.3 million in 
its general account was insufficient to satisfy its pre-petition obligations to its customers and GRI.  
The bankruptcy court found that this amount represents the lowest intermediate balance in the 
general account, and no party has challenged this finding as clearly erroneous.  Therefore, Columbia 
may distribute only the $3.3 million on a pro rata basis to its customers and GRI to satisfy its pre-
petition obligations.  The remainder of its pre-petition obligations to its customers and GRI will be 
unsecured debt.”). 
 130.  Id. at 1063 (“The obligations owed to upstream pipelines clearly are debts.  Columbia owes 
the upstream pipelines money for goods and services they have provided to Columbia.  Although 
Columbia’s customers pay the charges of the upstream suppliers dollar-for-dollar through 
Columbia’s rates, . . .  Columbia does not act as a conduit or a collecting agent for the upstream 
suppliers.  The upstream pipelines are in the same position as every other unsecured creditor.”). 
 131.  Mid-Atlantic Supply, Inc. v. Three Rivers Aluminum Co. (In re Mid Atlantic Supply Co.), 
790 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 132.  Id. at 1127 (“The check in this case, though made payable jointly to Mid-Atlantic and 
TRACO, was thus intended as a payment to TRACO by Lawson for the windows . . . .  The district 
court correctly found on these facts that there was a constructive trust in favor of TRACO under the 
law of Virginia, that equitable title and right of possession in the check and its proceeds (subject to 
the exception later noted) belonged to TRACO, and that there was accordingly a constructive trust in 
favor of TRACO . . . .”). 
 133.  R3RUE § 7 (“Mistaken Performance of Another’s Obligation”); see infra Appendix A. 
 134.  R3RUE § 8 (“Mistaken Discharge of Obligation or Lien”); see infra Appendix A. 
 135.  See R3RUE § 6 cmt. b (“A mistaken payor has a claim in restitution when money is 
mistakenly transferred to someone other than the intended recipient.”). 
 136.  See supra text accompanying note 81.  The claimant would have been able to assert a 
proprietary claim as to the traceable proceeds of the check had the subcontractor succeeded in 
negotiating it.  R3RUE § 50 (“Innocent Recipient”); see infra Appendix A. 
 137.  See Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985) 
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imposition of a constructive trust in bankruptcy.  But for the decision of the 
Sixth Circuit in Omegas, bankruptcy courts have been authorized to impose 
a constructive trust when appropriate for claims founded on unjust 
enrichment.  The cautionary language employed by some courts is 
unnecessary; the principle of property, properly cabined by the limiting rules 
of the R3RUE, is not contrary to the principle of pari passu.  A claimant’s 
interest in property, whether legal or equitable, can be preserved and should 
not be taken to satisfy the claims of others. 
2.  Avoidance 
Regardless of a claimant’s success in obtaining a constructive trust in 
bankruptcy, the benefits will be short lived if the trustee has the power to 
avoid it.  Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code provides distinct powers to 
avoid certain interests in both personal property and real estate.141  To the 
extent that the avoidance powers ultimately rest on state common law, the 
R3RUE’s restatement of that law will be significant.  To the extent that 
statutes reflect the relevant state or federal law, the R3RUE’s effect will be 
marginal.142 
(recognizing fraud as a substantive basis of unjust enrichment and constructive trust as a remedy, but 
finding no basis for constructive trust on facts of case). 
 138.  See Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming imposition of constructive 
trust on parcel of real estate on account of debtor’s fraud but holding that it was avoidable by trustee 
under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2006) of the Bankruptcy Code); see infra note 149. 
 139.  See Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Unicom Computer Corp. (In re Unicom Computer Corp.), 13 F.3d 
321 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing mistake as a substantive basis of unjust enrichment and 
constructive trust as remedy). 
 140.  See City Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Gen. Coffee Corp. (In re Gen. Coffee Corp.), 828 F.2d 699 
(11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing fraud as substantive basis of unjust enrichment and constructive trust 
as remedy). 
 141.  See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2006) (“Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to 
certain creditors and purchasers: (a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and 
without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may 
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable 
by—(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and 
that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a 
creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor 
exists; (2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, 
and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution against the debtor that is 
returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or (3) a bona fide purchaser 
of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such 
transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such 
transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.”). 
 142.  See R3RUE § 60 cmt. a (“Common-law priorities in insolvency may be altered by statute—
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In short, § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the 
bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of a judicial lien creditor as of the 
commencement of the case.  While section 9–317 of the U.C.C. provides a 
rule that addresses the priority of judicial lien creditors with respect to 
personal property, it does so only with respect to a competitor who holds a 
security interest, not a claimant entitled to a proprietary remedy.143  But for 
the R3RUE, resolution of a competition between holders of a proprietary 
remedy and judicial lien creditors could only be found in the vagaries of 
state execution law.  Tracking the majority of cases decided under execution 
statutes and the common law, section 60(1) of the R3RUE makes it clear 
that one who holds “a right to restitution from identifiable property [in the 
hands of a recipient] is superior to the competing rights of a creditor of the 
recipient who is not a . . . purchaser.”144  A creditor, even one who has levied 
and obtained a judicial lien on some item of personal property, is 
subordinate to a proprietary interest.145  By contrast, the interest of a 
purchaser,146 even one who has obtained only a security interest in some item 
of personal property, is superior to a proprietary interest.147  A bankruptcy 
most notably, by the various state recording acts, by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and 
by federal bankruptcy law.  The provisions of this section are accordingly subject to be altered, or 
altogether displaced, by applicable statute law.”). 
 143.  See U.C.C. § 9–317 (2011) (“Interests that Take Priority Over or Take Free of Security 
Interest or Agricultural Lien: (a) [Conflicting security interests and rights of lien creditors]  A 
security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights of: (1) a person entitled to priority 
under Section 9–322; and (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a person that becomes a 
lien creditor before the earlier of the time: (A) the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected; or 
(B) one of the conditions specified in Section 9–203(b)(3) is met and a financing statement covering 
the collateral is filed.”); see also R3RUE § 60 cmt. e (“ A restitution claimant who seeks to assert an 
unrecorded security interest will typically be seeking a remedy via subrogation, as a means of 
rectifying a transaction affected by fraud or mistake.  The cases make it clear that § 9–317 does not 
displace the law of subrogation; rather, the law of subrogation supplements the priorities established 
by Article 9.”). 
 144.  See R3RUE §60; see also Osin v. Johnson, 243 F.2d 653, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that 
the right of victim of fraud to constructive trust in property conveyed to defendant is superior to a 
“judgment creditor possessing a statutory lien.”). 
 145.  See R3RUE § 60 cmt. a (“Restitution is advantageous to the claimant because the common 
law (including the elements of both law and equity that make up this part of the law of restitution) 
gives priority in insolvency to the rights of an owner over the rights of a creditor . . . .”).  But see 
R3RUE § 60 cmt. b (“Because a judicial lien creditor may be given the rights of a bona fide 
purchaser by statute, the foregoing statements describe the outcome where no statue expands the lien 
creditor’s rights.”).  In any event, a claimant who cannot establish its interest in identifiable property 
is entitled to a monetary claim against the defendant that ranks equally with other general creditors.  
See R3RUE § 60(3). 
 146.  See R3RUE § 66 (“Bona Fide Purchaser”); see infra Appendix A. 
 147.  See R3RUE § 60(1), see infra Appendix A; see also Osin, 243 F.2d at 656 (“[T]he 
relationship between appellant [claimant] and Johnson [defendant] did not give appellant a claim 
superior to that of the trust holders who occupy the position of bona fide purchasers.” (citing Colo. 
Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U.S. 307, 314 (1887))). 
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trustee standing in the shoes of only a judicial lien creditor will thus not be 
able to avoid a constructive trust. 
However, § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code enhances the avoiding 
powers of the bankruptcy trustee.148  With the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Congress gave the trustee the powers of a bona fide 
purchaser of real estate with respect to certain transfers.149  While section 
60(1) of the R3RUE draws no distinction between personal property and real 
estate—a proprietary remedial interest has priority over a creditor with a 
judgment lien150 but is subordinate to a purchaser151 in both cases—judicial 
application of the avoiding powers and the vagaries of state recording laws 
have complicated matters.  A leading example of this complication is the 
decision of the Seventh Circuit in Belisle v. Plunkett152 where the court 
applied § 544(a)(3) to avoid a constructive trust.153  Several years before 
filing bankruptcy, Oliver Plunkett had obtained funds from a group of 
investors and used the funds to purchase real estate in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands in the name of the partnership.154  Plunkett fraudulently took the 
interests in his own name and ultimately filed bankruptcy.155  Judge 
Easterbrook acknowledged that, due to his fraud, Plunkett held the real 
estate as a constructive trustee for the investors,156 but went on to hold that 
the bankruptcy trustee, armed with the powers of a bona fide purchaser 
 148.  11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2006). 
 149.  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
 150.  See R3RUE § 60 cmt. b (“[I]t is undisputed that A’s rights in X must be superior to those of 
anyone who asserts an interest in X merely as B’s general creditor.”).  This is the case even if B’s 
general creditor obtains a judgment lien.  Id. (“When the question is adjudicated as a matter of 
common law and equity, unmodified by statute, the answer uniformly given is that a judicial lien 
creditor is not a purchaser for value . . . .”). 
 151.  See id. (“[I]t is likewise beyond question that A’s right to restitution of X—though iron-clad 
in a contest between A and B—will yield to the right of a transferee from B who purchases an 
interest in X for value and without notice.”). 
 152.  877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 153.  Id. at 516. 
 154.  Id. at 513 (“Through the spring and summer of 1979 Plunkett formed five partnerships to 
raise the money for the acquisition.  After getting the cash, Plunkett closed the deal in October 
1979—in his own name, despite using partnership funds.”). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. (“Plunkett bamboozled the partners and used for his own benefit the leasehold acquired 
with partnership funds.  Virgin Islands law impresses a constructive trust on the leasehold and its 
fruits.”). 
01 PRYOR SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:26 PM 
 
864 
under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, could avoid the unrecorded 
proprietary interests of the claimants.157 
Courts in the Ninth Circuit have also concluded that constructive trust 
can be avoided under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.  In Seaway 
Express158 a bank held a perfected security interest in its debtor’s accounts.159  
The debtor exchanged one of its accounts for real estate in violation of the 
security agreement.160  The bank was aware of the exchange but took no 
action to record any interest in the real estate.161  After the debtor’s filing 
under Chapter 11, the bank claimed an interest in the price of the real estate 
as “proceeds” of its borrower’s accounts under Article 9, and as the 
beneficiary of a constructive trust on the real estate.162  The bank lost at all 
levels on both claims.163  With respect to a constructive trust, the Ninth 
Circuit did not decide whether one existed on these facts,164 but held that the 
trustee could avoid it under § 544(a)(3) in any event.165  The court advanced 
two reasons for its conclusion.  First, it cited Plunkett without further 
analysis.166  Second, it rejected the bank’s argument that it had done all it 
could; it should not be mulcted, the bank had claimed, when it had no means 
to perfect its interest in the real estate without the debtor’s cooperation.167  In 
 157.  Id. at 515: 
A bona fide purchaser from Plunkett would have taken ahead of the partners under local 
law. . . .  One of Plunkett’s creditors, extending $100,000 against a collateral assignment 
of the leasehold, actually obtained a position superior to that of the partners.  The Trustee 
claimed the same position for the estate . . . . 
See also Bridge v. Midlantic Nat’l Bank (In re Bridge), 18 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that 
under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code a trustee has power to avoid a claimant’s right to the 
remedy of equitable subrogation). 
 158.  Nat’l Bank of Alaska v. Erickson (In re Seaway Express Corp.), 912 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 159.  Id. at 1126. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. at 1127. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Citing Humphries v. Riveland, 407 P.2d 967 (Wash. 1965) (en banc) and Antoine v. 
Thornton (In re Estate of Thornton), 541 P.2d 1243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975), the Ninth Circuit held 
that Washington law authorized imposition of a constructive trust for simple breach of contract.  In 
re Seaway Express Corp., 912 F.2d at 1127.  In neither case did a Washington court impose a 
constructive trust.  For discussion of the limited situation in which the R3RUE recognizes a 
proprietary remedy for breach of contract, see infra text accompanying notes 336–340. 
 165.  In re Seaway Express Corp., 912 F.2d at 1128–29 (“When a creditor claims an inchoate 
equitable interest in real property owned by the debtor at the commencement of the case, which 
interest is not evidenced by a recorded instrument and not yet granted by a state court, the trustee as 
bona fide purchaser prevails.”). 
 166.  Id. at 1129–30 (“Although the section [544(a)(3)] empowers the trustee to avoid transfers, 
by its terms it also applies if no transfer has taken place.” (quoting Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 
515 (7th Cir. 1989))). 
 167.  Id. at 1127. 
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response, the Ninth Circuit pointed to Washington law and observed that the 
bank could have sought the appointment of a “commissioner to file the deed 
of trust on its behalf.”168  The bank’s failure to employ a legal remedy when 
it knew about the debtor’s transaction suggests that the trustee could have 
effectively employed the defense of laches.169 
Other courts have rejected Plunkett, holding that the trustee’s avoiding 
powers under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code do not reach a 
constructive trust.170  On such an account the avoiding powers are 
inapplicable because a proprietary remedy arises upon a transfer to the 
debtor and the avoiding powers reach only transfers by the debtor.171  Thus, 
the court in Rodolakis v. Pedone172 explicitly rejected the reasoning in 
Plunkett and concluded that a trustee “can only avoid a transfer of real estate 
previously made by the Debtor . . . .”173  The opaque language of § 544(a)(3) 
of the Bankruptcy Code that creates this confusion has been analyzed 
 168.  Id. at 1129.  Comment e to Section 60 of the R3RUE addresses the general effect of 
recording acts on the priority of holders of proprietary remedies.  See R3RUE § 60 cmt. e.  The 
comment begins by observing that “statutes of this kind are rarely significant to the priority contests 
that are the subject of the present section.”  Id.  “The transaction that underlies a typical restitution 
claim will frequently be outside the scope of standard recording-act provisions” because recording 
acts are designed to subordinate unrecorded interests of grantees to the creditors of grantors.  Id.  
Restitution claims are typically the opposite: “[I]t is Grantor (the restitution claimant) who seeks to 
avoid the transaction, while it is Grantee’s lien creditors who seek to confirm it.  The language of a 
typical recording act will not accommodate such a claim.”  Id.  Comment e also remarks that 
recording acts have frequently been held inapplicable to equitable interests generally.  Id.  However, 
comment e goes on to concede that recording acts may cut off the proprietary remedies of grantees 
in the face of competing claims of lien creditors of the grantor.  Id.  Such grantees, like the bank in 
Seaway, have easy access to recording act protection. 
 169.  See R3RUE § 70(2) (“[T]he relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled may be 
barred if (a) the claimant has unreasonably delayed bringing or prosecuting the action, after the 
clamant had notice of the facts . . . .”). 
 170.  See, e.g., Rodolakis v. Pedone (In re Belba), 226 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998). 
 171.  Briefly, the introductory paragraph of § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lays out the trustee’s 
general power to “avoid any transfer of property of the debtor” while § 544(a)(3) speaks specifically 
to the power of a “bona fide purchaser of real property” with respect to “such transfer.”  Plunkett 
concluded that “such transfer” referred broadly to any transfer over which a bona fide purchaser 
would have priority; Rodolakis, on the other hand, held that “such transfer” was limited to only the 
set of those transfers described in the introductory paragraph, i.e., transfers by and not to the debtor. 
 172.  Rodolakis v. Pedone (In re Belba), 226 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998). 
 173.  Id. at 743.  See also Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009, 
1015 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e find that the courts below erred in concluding that section 544 
empowers a bankruptcy trustee to retain for the benefit of the estate property that the debtor obtained 
by fraud and upon which state law has imposed a valid constructive trust.”); Mills v. Brown (In re 
Brown), 182 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) (“[Section] 544(a)(3) limits the bankruptcy 
trustee to avoiding transfers of real property made by the debtor . . . .”). 
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elsewhere, but the consensus favors preserving a proprietary remedy in the 
face of avoidance by the trustee.174 
The R3RUE cannot effect interpretation of federal law.  However, 
comments to the rule of priority in section 60 of the R3RUE articulate the 
historical common law basis for limiting the trustee’s avoiding powers and 
Congress has not clearly legislated to the contrary.  Application of R3RUE 
should thus change the result in Plunkett but not in Seaway. 
V.  EQUITABLE LIEN 
A.  From Equity 
The remedy of equitable lien has received less attention than 
constructive trust.  Claimants often seem to plead it simply as an alternative 
to its remedial cousin.175  Success with constructive trust gives a claimant the 
entire “bundle of sticks” of ownership, while an equitable lien represents 
less than the whole.176  On the other hand, the tight requirement between 
unjust enrichment and the defendant’s acquisition of title to identifiable 
property is relaxed when the claimant seeks only an equitable lien.177  
Moreover, from a practical point of view, even a claimant who could prevail 
on constructive trust might prefer an equitable lien if the property is worth 
less than the claim or might decline in value.178 
While recognition of a constructive trust removes property from the 
 174.  See, e.g., Kull, supra note 99; see also Gregg C. Gumbert, Note & Comment, The Trustee as 
a Bona Fide Purchaser of Real Property in Bankruptcy: Making Sense of Section 544(a)(3), 15 
BANKR. DEV. J. 121 (1998). 
 175.  See, e.g., Wilde v. Wilde, 576 F. Supp. 2d 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“When a constructive 
trust extends only to a portion of the property [acquired with trust funds], it is generally known as an 
equitable lien.” (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §§ 210, 161 cmt. a (1937); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
2007)). 
 176.  See R3RUE § 56 cmt. b (“Constructive trust transfers ownership of specific property from 
the holder of legal title to a person with a paramount equitable claim.  By contrast, equitable lien (as 
the name indicates) gives the claimant a security interest in property held by the defendant, rather 
than ownership.”). 
 177.  See id. (“[C]onstructive trust requires that the transaction giving rise to unjust enrichment be 
one in which the holder acquires title to the property in question or its traceable antecedents, in 
violation of the claimant’s rights; whereas equitable lien requires only that the holder’s unjust 
enrichment be traced into, or otherwise identified with, the property in which the claimant asserts a 
security interest.”). 
 178.  See id. (“The choice between the remedies depends on the present value of the assets in 
question.  Because constructive trust gives the claimant ownership of an asset (or a share therein), 
the value of the remedy fluctuates with the value of the asset.  By contrast, equitable lien secures 
payment of a liability that is fixed in amount: namely, the defendant’s unjust enrichment at the 
expense of the claimant, as determined by the rules of §§ 49–53.  Constructive trust is the natural 
choice for a case in which a wrongdoer has acquired an asset that has appreciated in value, while 
equitable lien will be more favorable if the value of the asset has declined.”). 
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bankruptcy estate, imposition of an equitable lien simply secures the 
defendant’s obligation to pay money—a claim—with a lien on an 
identifiable asset.179  The property remains part of the bankruptcy estate 
subject to the power of the claimant to seek adequate protection of its 
interest,180 and the claimant is ultimately entitled to the value of its lien on 
liquidation181 or in reorganization.182 
As with constructive trust, the claimant must establish an underlying 
claim in unjust enrichment before turning to the remedy of equitable lien.183  
Section 56 of the R3RUE provides that 
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by a transaction in which 
 (a) the claimant’s assets or services are applied to enhance or 
preserve the value of particular property to which the defendant 
has legal title, or more generally 
(b) the connection between unjust enrichment and the 
defendant’s ownership of particular property makes it equitable 
that the claimant have recourse to that property for the 
satisfaction of the defendant’s liability in restitution,  
the claimant may be granted an equitable lien on the property in 
question.184 
Unlike the second element of a constructive trust—that the defendant 
obtain title to identifiable property—an equitable lien requires only that the 
claimant establish a “nexus between the transaction giving rise to the 
 179.  R3RUE § 56 cmt. b (“Constructive trust transfers ownership of specific property from the 
holder of legal title to a person with a paramount equitable claim.  By contrast, equitable lien (as the 
name indicates) gives the claimant a security interest in property held by the defendant, rather than 
ownership.”). 
 180.  See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maxon Eng’g Servs., Inc. (In re Maxon Eng’g Servs., 
Inc.) 332 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2005) (stating that movant holding equitable lien is entitled to 
adequate protection). 
 181.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that payment on account 
of an equitable lien not avoidable as preference). 
 182.  See, e.g., Pelle v. Seidle (In re 18th Ave. Dev. Corp.), 6 B.R. 284 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). 
 183.  See R3RUE § 56 (“(2) An equitable lien secures the obligation of the defendant to pay the 
claimant the amount of the defendant’s unjust enrichment as separately determined.  Foreclosure of 
an equitable lien is subject to such conditions as the court may direct.”).  See supra text 
accompanying notes 33–54. 
 184.  R3RUE § 56(1). 
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liability in unjust enrichment and the property in which the claimant seeks 
remedial rights.”185  The connection between the predicate act and property 
of the defendant is attenuated with the reduction of the required relationship.  
Anticipating treatment of equitable liens in bankruptcy, the principle of pari 
passu becomes stronger as the principle of property is expressed in weaker 
terms. 
B.  Into Bankruptcy 
1.  Recognition 
Some have classified equitable liens as a subset of constructive trusts.186  
Even though constructive trusts have been met with a mixed reception in 
bankruptcy, no reported circuit court case has held that bankruptcy courts 
may not impose an equitable lien as a remedy for unjust enrichment.187  
Equitable liens have been applied by bankruptcy courts to provide a remedy 
to a claimant whose assets have been spent to improve property of the 
defendant.188  An equitable lien has been imposed on exempt unencumbered 
property to trace the proceeds of insurance wrongfully diverted from a 
mortgagee,189 and on an innocent co-tenant’s interest in property improved 
with funds obtained by the other co-tenant’s fraud.190  An equitable lien has 
also been used for the insurer whose insurance proceeds were paid by 
mistake to an insured who subsequently filed bankruptcy,191 and for a former 
 185.  Id. § 56 cmt. a. 
 186.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (“When 
imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, an equitable lien is a special and limited form of a 
constructive trust.”).  This position is something of an overstatement.  See Fulp v. Fulp, 140 S.E.2d 
708, 712 (N.C. 1965) (“An equitable lien, or encumbrance, is not an estate in land, nor is it a right 
which, in itself, may be the basis of a possessory action.  It is simply a charge upon the property, 
which charge subjects the property to the payment of the debt of the creditor in whose favor the 
charge exists.”). 
 187.  See, e.g., Provencher v. Berman, 699 F.2d 568, 570 (1st Cir. 1983) (“In such a situation 
[where a conscious wrongdoer has used commingled funds to buy property], the innocent party can 
choose either to enforce a lien on the property for the value of the estate’s funds or to enforce a 
constructive trust on the property.  This is a virtually universal rule . . . .”); see also Levy v. Kozyak 
(In re Fin. Federated Title & Trust, Inc.), 347 F.3d 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming order of 
bankruptcy court imposing equitable lien against otherwise exempt homestead property acquired 
with proceeds of fraud); Goldberg v. N.J. Lawyer’s Fund (In re Goldberg), 932 F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 188.  See, e.g., Carlson Orchards, Inc. v. Linsey (In re Linsey), 296 B.R. 582 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2003). 
 189.  See, e.g., United States v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 269 B.R. 829 (Bankr. D.N.D. 2001). 
 190.  See, e.g., Fin. Federated Title & Trust, 347 F.3d 880; In re Mesa, 232 B.R. 508 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1999). 
 191.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Angus (In re Angus), 9 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981). 
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spouse whose unsecured claim to proceeds due on sale of the marital 
residence would be discharged in the bankruptcy of the other spouse.192 
2.  Avoidance 
The Third Circuit affirmed avoidance of an equitable lien in real 
property in Midlantic National Bank v. Bridge.193  The claimant bank 
refinanced its borrower’s mortgage.194  The closing agent recorded a 
satisfaction of the original mortgage but failed to record the new mortgage 
securing the financed debt.195  The borrower/mortgagor then filed 
bankruptcy.196  The circuit court affirmed Midlantic’s claim to an equitable 
lien197 but concluded that a subsequent purchaser for value would take free 
of the lien under New Jersey law.198    Section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that the trustee has the more extensive powers of a bona fide 
purchaser for value as of the filing.199  Thus, the trustee had the power to 
avoid Midlantic’s equitable lien on the debtor’s real property. 
The court’s decision (and New Jersey law) is consistent with section 56 
of the R3RUE.  As comment f observes, “[t]he modern equitable lien is 
usually [but not exclusively] employed as a remedy for unjust 
enrichment.”200  In the Midlantic case, the defendant was not enriched 
because he still owed Midlantic repayment of the money lent.201  However, 
to the extent that his property was no longer subject to a recorded mortgage, 
the likelihood of the bank recovering the debt was diminished.202  The 
 192.  See Hart v. Hart (In re Hart), 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985), questioned by the 9th Cir. 
in Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Wells v. Wells (In 
re Wells), 160 B.R. 726 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 193.  Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Bridge (In re Bridge), 18 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 194.  Id. at 197. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 198. 
 197.  Id. at 201 (“[When] a creditor’s new security . . . prove[s] to be defective due to fraud or 
some kind of mistake. . . . the doctrine of equitable subrogation can operate to subrogate the new 
creditor to the position of the lender whose lien was discharged and permits the new creditor to 
assert its right to priority against subsequent claimants.”). 
 198.  Id. at 204 (“We therefore conclude that, under New Jersey law, the rights of the trustee, as a 
hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real property for value without notice, prevail over the rights of 
Midlantic, as the holder of an unrecorded equitable lien, and prevent the operation of equitable 
subrogation in this case.”). 
 199.  See supra text accompanying notes 148-51. 
 200.  R3RUE § 56 cmt. f. 
 201.  See In re Bridge, 18 F.3d at 197. 
 202.  Id. at 197–98. 
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erroneous elimination of the encumbrance thus indirectly enriches a 
debtor.203  Subsequent enrichment of third parties such as creditors is even 
clearer.204  Unencumbered title to a debtor’s property increases the assets 
available for their payment.205  Yet,  section 66 of the R3RUE observes that 
good-faith purchasers for value take “free of equitable interests that a 
restitution claimant might have asserted.”206  Given that § 544(a)(3) of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides the bankruptcy trustee with the status of such a 
purchaser , the Midlantic court correctly affirmed the avoidance of the 
bank’s equitable lien.207 
Other courts have avoided equitable liens in bankruptcy as preferential 
transfers.208  The bankruptcy court in Cedar Funding held that the equitable 
liens of hundreds of investors in mortgages originated by the debtor did not 
protect their equitable interests from avoidance by the trustee.209  According 
to the court, assignments of fractional interests in the mortgages recorded 
within the ninety-day preference period were avoidable notwithstanding any 
pre-existing equitable lien held by the assignees.210  Had the court held that 
the investors had constructive liens from the outset, the later-conveyed 
mortgages would not have improved their positions.211  In effect, they simply 
would have exchanged their equitable proprietary interests for legal ones and 
would not have received more than they would have had there been no 
mortgages; thus, no preferential transfer.212 
Cedar Funding drew support for its conclusion from dicta of the district 
court in Cadle Co. v. Mangan.213  The labyrinthine facts of Cadle reveal just 
how difficult it is to collect a judgment from a recalcitrant debtor.214  
 203.  R3RUE § 56 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008) (“Sometimes an equitable lien [is] 
explained by reference to the apparent or presumed intentions of the parties . . . .”). 
 204.  See R3RUE § 56 cmt. f (2011). 
 205.  See id. 
 206.  R3RUE § 66; see infra Appendix A. 
 207.  See In re Bridge,18 F.3d at 204. That the unrecorded transfer was by the debtor in Midlantic 
distinguishes it from Plunkett. See supra text accompanying notes 152-157. 
 208.  See Neilson v. Aguirre (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), Bankr. No. 08–52709–MM, 2010 WL 
1346365, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. (“[I]t would make little sense to impose an equitable lien under the circumstances of this 
proceeding because any such lien would be avoidable as a preference.”); see also Sovran Bank v. 
United States (In re Aumiller), 168 B.R. 811 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994) (finding that an equitable lien 
arose at time of claimant’s demand for recording). 
 211.  Cf. In re Cedar Funding, 2010 WL 1346365, at *6. 
 212.  See, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006) (“(b) [T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property—(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive 
if—(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) 
such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.”). 
 213.  316 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 
503 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 214.  Id. 
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Distilled to a minimum, Cadle had a judgment against Charles Flanagan.215  
Flanagan failed to surrender his valuable shares of stock in a closely-held 
corporation notwithstanding various post-judgment orders of Connecticut 
courts.216  However, shortly before filing bankruptcy, Flanagan at last paid 
Cadle with the proceeds of a loan from his father.217  When the trustee sued 
to recover the payment as a preference, Cadle claimed the payment had been 
fully secured by an equitable lien on the underlying stock.218  Even though 
the court concluded that Cadle did not have an equitable lien under 
Connecticut law, citing the first Restatement of Restitution,219 it went on to 
hold in dicta that in any event equitable liens do not “relate back” to the time 
of the predicate wrongdoing but instead only to the time of enforcement.220  
Because Cadle, despite his best efforts, had not successfully enforced his 
equitable lien before the preference period, the judgment against Flanagan 
was never secured and the payment to Cadle was an avoidable preference.221 
Use of the phrase “equitable lien” by the courts in Midlantic, Cedar 
Funding, and Cadle exposes a latent ambiguity.222  Equitable lien may refer 
to either a remedy for an uncompleted and thus unperfected secured 
transaction223 or to a remedy for unjust enrichment.224  Section 56 of the 
 215.  Id. at 14. 
 216.  Id. at 14–15. 
 217.  Id. at 15. 
 218.  Id. at 21–22 (“The narrower argument that Appellants make is that had they received a 
perfected judicial lien absent Flanagan’s misconduct, then, for preference purposes, the perfection of 
the lien itself would be unavoidable as a transfer, as it would have come into existence prior to the 
90–day preference period, and Flanagan’s subsequent payment of $99,542.87 would be unavoidable 
because it would not have improved Cadle’s position.”). 
 219.  Id. at 22 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 161(1937) (“Where property of 
one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the ground 
that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises.”)).  For the modern 
statement of the rule, see R3RUE § 56 (2011). 
 220.  Cadle Co., 316 B.R. at 23 (quoting NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2d § 57:29) 
(“The appropriate conclusion is that, for purposes of Code § 547, an equitable lien is transferred 
when steps to declare or enforce it are taken and without the benefit of any relation-back principle.  
As a result, if the lien is enforced within the relevant preference period, and other elements of a 
preference are present, it will typically constitute an avoidable transfer for an antecedent debt.”)). 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See infra notes 231–34 and accompanying text. 
 223.  See R3RUE § 56 cmt. e (“Equitable lien as a means to establish intended security.  One of 
the most characteristic uses of equitable lien is to readjust transactions that have miscarried—
because of mistake, inattention, or wrongful interference—depriving the claimant of an intended 
element of security.  Employed in this way, an equitable lien takes the place of the consensual lien 
that the claimant would have obtained if the transaction had gone as originally planned.”). 
 224.  See R3RUE § 56 cmt. a (“As with all of the asset-based remedies in restitution, moreover, 
the claimant must establish a nexus between the transaction giving rise to the liability in unjust 
01 PRYOR SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:26 PM 
 
872 
R3RUE § 56 explicitly authorizes both applications,225 but the principle of 
pari passu presents the stronger case when the claimant neglected to protect 
its proprietary interest through available legal means.226  Indeed, the 
comprehensive scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
effectively preempts any place for equitable perfection of security interests 
in personal property.227  Even though room remains under state law for 
equitable perfection with respect to an interest in real estate, the principle of 
pari passu—buttressed by the trustee’s avoiding powers under § 544(a)(3) of 
the Bankruptcy Code—warrants the avoidance of such an equitable lien in 
bankruptcy.228 
Conversely, where a claimant has established a predicate for a claim of 
unjust enrichment rather than a simple failure to perfect a legal interest, the 
remedy of equitable lien should be available notwithstanding the defendant’s 
bankruptcy.229  Courts should resolve issues related to the avoidability of 
equitable liens as a remedy for unjust enrichment as they do constructive 
trusts.230 
enrichment and the property in which the claimant seeks remedial rights.”). 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See id. § 56 cmt. e (“Any such use of the equitable lien [to establish intended security] is 
potentially in conflict with the formal arrangements by which consensual liens are normally created 
and perfected.  Before a court will impose an equitable lien to rescue a claimant who has failed to 
take appropriate steps to obtain security, it must be satisfied that the remedy will not undermine the 
relevant statutory scheme.”); see also Naja, L.L.C. v. Jack’s Co. (In re Dynamis Group, L.L.C.), 441 
B.R. 841 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2011) (filing lis pendens preserved equitable lien of unperfected land 
contract vendor); Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 B.R. 104, 119 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[A]n equitable lien will not be upheld as against a trustee where all 
available means of perfecting a legal lien were not employed by the would-be secured creditor.”). 
 227.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9–101 cmt. 1 (2011) (“As did its predecessor, it [Revised Article 9] 
provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and 
fixtures.”).  But see infra text accompanying notes 273–96 for the role of subrogation with respect to 
existing perfected security interests. 
 228.  It would have done less violence to the law of unjust enrichment had the Cedar Funding 
court permitted avoidance of the equitable lien under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, rather 
than as a preference.  See Neilson v. Aguirre (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), Bankr. No. 08–52709–
MM, 2010 WL 1346365 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010).  Contrary to the court’s holding, comment 
e to section 56 of the R3RUE observes that “[l]ike a constructive trust, an equitable lien is effective 
at the time of the transaction that gives rise to it, not when its existence is subsequently declared by 
the court.”  The debtor’s assignments of interests in the underlying mortgages occurred long before 
the preference period.  See id.  For discussion of the legitimate application of § 544(a)(3) in such a 
situation, see supra text accompanying notes 172–73 discussing Seaway Express. 
 229.  See, e.g., Lui-M Corp. v Garland Corp. (In re Garland Corp.), 6 B.R. 452, 455 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1980) (applying Florida law) (“There is [legal] authority for granting an equitable lien when 
legal rights are lost as a result of fraud.”); see also Mulhern v. Albin, 163 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1947) 
(“The bankruptcy court was empowered to distribute to creditors of the bankrupt only such interest 
in property as the bankrupt had.  Where, as in this case, she had only a legal title to the lands 
accruing to her through fraudulent conduct . . . the bankruptcy court may not refuse to recognize the 
equitable lien . . . .”). 
 230.  See supra Part IV. 
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VI.  SUBROGATION 
A.  From Equity 
The third proprietary remedy described in the R3RUE is subrogation.231  
Ambiguous use of the term “subrogation” makes it important to distinguish 
between the claim and the remedy, each going by the same name.232 
1.  Subrogation as a Claim—Equitable Subrogation 
Section 24 of the R3RUE describes the claim of equitable 
subrogation.233  Like the better-known remedies of indemnity and 
contribution,234 equitable subrogation reallocates ultimate responsibility from 
one who paid a debt to another whom the law deems should have paid it.235  
Unlike indemnity and contribution, however, equitable subrogation applies 
when the claims against the obligors arise from different bases of liability.236  
Comparison of several illustrations makes this distinction clear.  When two 
persons are jointly liable on a note, payment by one creates a claim against 
the other by operation of law;237 thus, when two obligors are liable on the 
same claim and one pays, the claimant’s remedy is labeled 
indemnification.238  Illustration 1 to section 23 of the R3RUE provides an 
example: 
A becomes an accommodation endorser on a note for $10,000 
payable to B, issued by C and D as co-makers.  A signs at the sole 
 231.  See R3RUE § 57 (“Subrogation as a Remedy”); see infra Appendix A. 
 232.  See id. § 24 cmt. b (“The ambiguous term ‘subrogation’”). 
 233.  Id. § 24 (“Performance of an Independent Obligation (Equitable Subrogation)”); see infra 
Appendix A. 
 234.  See id. § 23 (“Performance of a Joint Obligation (Indemnity and Contribution)”); see infra 
Appendix A. 
 235.  See R3RUE § 24 cmt. b (“[A] claim under this section is independent of contract . . . .  It 
arises, rather, as a function of the obligors’ respective positions vis-à-vis the third-party obligee and 
of the events giving rise to the obligee’s underlying claim.  It rests on the equitable principle, 
expressed in innumerable decisions, that seeks ‘to compel the ultimate discharge of a debt by him 
who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it.’”). 
 236.  See id. § 24 cmt. d (“The most frequent claim within § 24 is one that arises between 
independent obligors.  Here both claimant and defendant are liable to the third-party obligee, but on 
different grounds; the claimant asserts (as in cases of indemnity) that the defendant’s obligation was 
in some relevant sense primary and its own merely secondary.”). 
 237.  See id. § 23. 
 238.  Id. § 23 cmt. a. 
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request of C and without the knowledge of D.  The note being 
unpaid at maturity, A pays B $10,000.  A has a claim to indemnity in 
the amount of $10,000, enforceable against C and D or either of 
them.  (See U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (rev. 1990).)  C’s liability to 
indemnify A is simultaneously explained in terms of contract and in 
terms of restitution, while D’s liability to A is in restitution 
exclusively.239 
All the claims of payee B against A, C, and D arise from the same 
underlying obligation, the promissory note.  Thus, indemnity is the form of 
A’s remedy against C and D.  Conversely, Illustration 1 to section 24 of the 
R3RUE gives an example of claims against two obligors whose legal bases 
are distinct: 
Vendor sells Blackacre to Purchaser with a warranty against 
encumbrances.  Purchaser’s title is insured by Title Co.  Blackacre 
is subject to an undisclosed encumbrance that diminishes its value.  
Title Co. compensates Purchaser for the loss.  Title Co. (whose 
obligation to Purchaser derives from the insurance contract) has a 
claim under this section against Vendor (whose obligation to 
Purchaser derives from the deed).240 
Even though there is no preexisting legal relationship between Vendor 
and Title Co., the law has long insisted241 that Vendor would be unjustly 
enriched were Title Co. not able to compel it to share in the liability each 
owed to Purchaser.242  Such compulsory sharing is labeled equitable 
subrogation.243 
2.  Subrogation as a Claim—A “Better Right” 
As Justice Black observed years ago, “probably there are few doctrines 
better established than that a surety who pays the debt of another is entitled 
to all the rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be 
 239.  R3RUE § 23 cmt. a, illus. 1 (italics added). 
 240.  See id. § 24 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
 241.  See, e.g., In re Lentz’s Accounts, Wallace’s Appeal, 5 Pa. 103 (Pa. 1847). 
 242.  See Douberley v. Angelini, 240 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970): 
 The title insurer discharged its liability under its title insurance policy by payment to 
the purchasers of the amount agreed upon between them as to the value of the part taken, 
and thereupon the title insurer became subrogated to the rights of the purchasers against 
the sellers for breach of warranty. 
For a recent case that failed to credit the role of equitable subrogation, see Wilder Corp. of Del. v. 
Thompson Drainage & Levee Dist., 658 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (dicta). 
 243.  See R3RUE § 24. 
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reimbursed.”244  Section 48 of the R3RUE states the substantive basis in 
unjust enrichment for the subrogation claim by the surety or other third party 
who discharges the obligation of a primary obligor; in short, the surety has 
what the R3RUE characterizes as a “better right.”245  Not only does payment 
by the claimant create a right against the primary obligor under the principle 
of equitable subrogation,246 but the same payment generates a claim against a 
third party who would receive or retain payment due to the primary obligor 
because of the claimant’s payment.247  In a typical case, a surety’s 
intervention permits a project to be completed notwithstanding the default of 
the primary obligor.  The surety’s action thus satisfies a condition to a duty 
of a third party (typically the owner) to pay.  The payment should, the law of 
equity has long held, be made to the surety even if the third party did not 
expressly so promise.248  The surety has a “better right” than the primary 
obligor to get it or than the third party to keep it.249  By extension, the “better 
right” of the surety vis-à-vis both the primary obligor and the third party has 
priority over the obligor’s secured creditor250 and trustee in bankruptcy.251 
 244.  Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136–37 (1962).  Justice Black went on to 
comment that “there is a security interest in a withheld fund . . . to which the surety is 
subrogated . . . .”  Id. at 137. 
 245.  R3RUE § 48 (“Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better Right”); see 
Appendix A. 
 246.  See supra text accompanying notes 241–45; infra text accompanying notes 247–50. 
 247.  See R3RUE § 48 cmt. a (“In its application to many cases, the rule of § 48 is best understood 
and explained as the logical converse to the rules of §§ 23–24 governing indemnity, contribution, 
and equitable subrogation.  Enrichment under the latter headings derives from the claimant’s 
discharge of an obligation for which the defendant is primarily responsible, while enrichment under 
§ 48 derives from the defendant’s receipt of a payment to which the claimant is primarily entitled.”); 
see also R3RUE § 57 cmt. e (“When A’s money is used to discharge B’s obligation to C, the most 
visible effect of subrogation is to clothe A with C’s former rights against B and B’s property.  
Subrogation extends to another important mode of substitution, permitting A to enforce not only C’s 
rights against B but B’s rights in the transaction as well, such as obligations of performance owed to 
B by C or other parties . . . .” (italics added)). 
 248.  Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 136 (“Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their principal 
have been deemed entitled to reimbursement, even without a contractual promise . . . .”). 
 249.  See R3RUE § 48. 
 250.  See First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co. v. Modular Structures, Inc. (In re Modular Structures, Inc.), 
27 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that payments due from obligor were neither “accounts” of the 
defaulting debtor/primary obligee nor property of the estate and thus were properly payable to 
surety); see also R3RUE § 48 illus. 28 (“Farmer grows corn on land leased from Landlord.  Farmer’s 
operations are financed by Bank, which holds a perfected security interest in Farmer’s growing crops 
and their proceeds.  By statute, Landlord has a lien on the products of the leased acreage securing 
Farmer’s obligation to pay rent.  (The statute provides that a crop lien of the kind held by Landlord is 
not a ‘security interest’ within the local version of U.C.C. Article 9 and that it is ‘paramount to all 
other liens or claims’ upon such products and their proceeds.)  Farmer sells his corn crop to Elevator 
for $25,000.  Elevator pays farmer with a check payable to Farmer and Bank jointly; Farmer 
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Similar conclusions follow outside the typical suretyship context, 
although the fact-driven analysis of “better right” makes it more difficult to 
predict judicial conclusions.  Thus, in Rinn v. First Union,252 the district 
court held that a refinancing but unperfected secured creditor should be 
subrogated to the still-filed interest of the discharged secured creditor and 
prevail over the bankruptcy trustee.253  But the bankruptcy court in Vieira v. 
Pearce254 found that, unlike the debtor in Rinn, the debtors had not agreed to 
deliver a first secured position to their refinancing creditor whose late 
recording rendered its mortgage avoidable as a preference.255  The 
bankruptcy court in Pearce therefore concluded that the refinancing creditor 
did not have a “better right” than the primary obligor and mortgagor.256  The 
determination of the “better right” necessary to establish a claim against a 
defendant other than the primary obligor is not a free-floating exercise of 
moral inquiry; the right must be one “that is both recognized, and accorded 
priority over the interest of the defendant, under the law of the 
jurisdiction.”257  Given the usual ability of the claimant to protect itself, the 
principle of pari passu should inform the analysis of the bankruptcy court 
and generally supersede such an atypical claim of subrogation. 
endorses the check, and Bank applies the proceeds against Farmer’s outstanding debt to Bank.  
When Bank obtains payment of the check, Bank is aware that Farmer owes Landlord $15,000 in rent 
that was due on sale of the crop.  Landlord is entitled to recover $15,000 from Bank by the rule of 
this section.  As between the competing obligees (Landlord and Bank), the priority of Landlord’s 
claim is established by the crop lien statute; while Bank’s notice of Landlord’s claim deprives Bank 
of the defense it could otherwise assert as a bona fide payee (§ 67).”). 
 251.  See Pearlman, 371 U.S. 132. 
 252.  Rinn v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995). 
 253.  Id. at 416.  In arriving at this holding, the court explained: 
Section 1–103 of the U.C.C. provides, however, that “[u]nless displaced by the particular 
provisions of [the U.C.C.] . . . the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its 
provisions.”  Courts have consistently held that “[n]othing in the provisions of Title 9 
regarding secured transactions expressly or implicitly refutes the application of 
subrogation.”  Therefore, the formal procedures mandated by the U.C.C. may be 
supplemented by the principles of equitable subrogation. 
Id. at 410 (citations omitted). 
 254.  Vieira v. Pearce (In re Pearce), 236 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1999). 
 255.  Id. at 265 (“Unlike in Rinn where the debtors agreed to continuation of the first lender’s 
perfected status as provided in the commitment letter, there is no indication here of any agreement 
that Burnett would assume Fleet’s perfected status in the subject real estate.”). 
 256.  Id. at 267. 
 257.  R3RUE § 48 cmt. i.  Comment i goes on to observe that: 
Proof merely that the defendant has received a windfall, that the claimant has been ill-
treated, and that the third party’s payment to the defendant (or the defendant’s retention 
of payment as against the claimant) violates rules of good faith, basic fairness, or 
common decency, does not suffice to make out a claim in restitution under § 48 . . . . 
Id. 
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3.  Subrogation as a Remedy 
Subrogation as a remedy is described in section 57 of the R3RUE.258  
Like constructive trust and equitable lien, this remedy requires both an 
instance of unjust enrichment and a “transactional nexus” with identifiable 
property of the defendant.259  Unlike constructive trust and equitable lien, 
however, the remedy of subrogation does not arise out of the acquisition of 
identifiable property or even the improvement of specific property, but 
rather from the use of the claimant’s property “to satisfy an obligation of the 
defendant or [to discharge] a lien on the defendant’s property.”260  The 
defendant’s enrichment in such a case is not by gaining new assets, but from 
a reduction in liabilities secured by old ones.  The latter is no less a type of 
enrichment than the former.261 
Moreover, unlike constructive trust and equitable lien, subrogation as a 
remedy is not necessarily limited to remedying substantive claims of unjust 
enrichment.  Subrogation by contract is the most commonly employed form 
of the remedy, particularly in contracts of insurance.262  Subrogation is also 
part of the law of suretyship apart from any substantive basis in unjust 
enrichment.263  This Article, however, will consider only the implications of 
subrogation as a remedy for a substantive claim of unjust enrichment. 
 258.  Id. § 57 (“Subrogation as a Remedy”); see infra Appendix A. 
 259.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. a (“Subrogation (using the word in its remedial sense) is one of the 
methods of asset-based restitution that may be available to a claimant who can establish both (i) 
unjust enrichment at the expense of the claimant, and (ii) a transactional nexus making it appropriate 
that the claimant obtain restitution via rights in identifiable property of the defendant.”);see also id. 
(“Unjust enrichment for which subrogation is an available remedy may be established by any of the 
substantive rules of this Restatement that describe the transaction in question.”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 35–56. 
 260.  R3RUE § 57 cmt. a. 
 261.  See id. § 1 cmt. d (“A saved expenditure or a discharged obligation is no less beneficial to 
the recipient than a direct transfer.”). 
 262.  See id. § 24 cmt. b (“A contractual subrogation provision is typically a term in an insurance 
contract by which the policyholder agrees that the insurer, on paying a loss, shall be entitled to assert 
the policyholder’s right of recovery against persons responsible.  The effect to be given to such a 
provision is a matter of contract and insurance law.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) SURETYSHIP 
& GUAR. § 28 (1996) (distinguishing between contracts of indemnity and other forms of insurance). 
 263.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. a (“Subrogation is even more prominent in the law of suretyship, 
where a right to subrogation—whether based on unjust enrichment or otherwise—is one of the 
classic incidents of the relationship between principal and surety.”); see also U.C.C. § 3–419(f) (“An 
accommodation party who pays the instrument is entitled to reimbursement from the accommodated 
party and is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accommodated party.  An accommodated 
party who pays the instrument has no right of recourse against, and is not entitled to contribution 
from, an accommodation party.”); U.C.C. §3–419 cmt. 5 (“Since the accommodation party that pays 
the instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accommodated party, the 
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Subrogation as a remedy can intersect with a defendant’s insolvency 
proceedings in two important respects.  First, subrogation to security can 
affect recoveries when more than two parties are involved.264  When there is 
a single claimant and only one defendant, a claimant’s discharge of a lien on 
the defendant’s property can be remedied equally well by payment of the 
amount discharged or by substituting the claimant to the position of the 
discharged lienor.265  But the relationships are more complex when there are 
junior lienholders.266  Payment of the amount discharged will always satisfy 
the claimant.  However, when the defendant is insolvent and unable to pay, 
only subrogation to the lien of the discharged lienor will be an adequate 
remedy.  Illustration 8 to section 57 of the R3RUE describes such a scenario: 
 Blackacre has been mortgaged in succession to A and to B.  
Taxes on the property are delinquent: A pays the amount due to 
prevent a tax sale.  When A commences foreclosure proceedings, 
the court determines that A’s mortgage was improperly recorded, 
with the result that B’s later mortgage has first priority.  Because the 
present value of Blackacre is insufficient to cover the mortgage debt 
to B, A’s payment of taxes has preserved the value of B’s mortgage 
instead of his own.  A has a claim in restitution to prevent B’s unjust 
enrichment at A’s expense (§ 8(2)).  The remedy is by subrogation 
to the tax lien that A’s funds were used to discharge.267 
A’s payment of the property taxes clearly enriched the owner of 
Blackacre.  And if Blackacre’s owner doesn’t pay, A has a claim in unjust 
enrichment against him.268  But what of B—has A’s payment of taxes on 
Blackacre enriched her?  The answer is equally yes.  Had A not paid the 
taxes, B’s recovery would have been reduced pro tanto.  B has thus been 
enriched, but the question remains whether this enrichment is unjust.  
According to section 8(2) of the R3RUE, it would be unjust due to A’s 
mistake about the status of its mortgage.269  Thus, unless B pays A, A will be 
subrogated to the priority of the discharged tax lien. 
Second, the law of equity provided that a claimant entitled to 
subrogation is also entitled to “the priority of a preferred but unsecured 
accommodation party also obtains rights to any security interest or other collateral that secures 
payment of the instrument.”). 
 264.  See generally R3RUE § 57. 
 265.  See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 266.  See, e.g., Stein v. Simpson, 230 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (acknowledging junior 
lienholder’s right to redeem property and be subrogated to the benefits of the senior lienholder). 
 267.  R3RUE § 57 illus. 8 (italics added). 
 268.  R3RUE § 26 (“Protection of Claimant’s Property”); see infra Appendix A. 
 269.  R3RUE § 8 (“Mistaken Discharge of Obligation or Lien”); see infra Appendix A. 
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creditor.”270  Outside of bankruptcy this rule may remain the case, but 
§ 507(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides otherwise for cases arising under 
Title 11.271  Thus, apart from subrogation to security, subrogation as remedy 
for unjust enrichment will have little impact in bankruptcy.272 
B.  Into Bankruptcy 
Subrogation as a remedy historically has presented little difficulty in 
bankruptcy.273  Both constructive trust and equitable lien subject property to 
which the debtor holds unencumbered legal title to an equitable proprietary 
claim.274  Subrogation, by contrast, substitutes a third party to the rights held 
by another.275  By definition, the debtor’s estate is made no worse, although 
the opportunity for its enhancement is foregone.276  Recognition of this well-
recognized principle of property continues in the R3RUE. 
Section 57 of the R3RUE277 provides a rule for subrogation to the 
collateral position of a discharged lienor.  As with the other proprietary 
remedies, the claimant must establish that the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched.278  Subrogation may also follow the result of the application of the 
law of equitable subrogation in section 24 of the R3RUE279 or the “better 
right” analysis of section 48 of the R3RUE280 but, in any case, is chiefly 
 270.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. c. 
 271.  11 U.S.C. § 507(d) (2006) (“An entity that is subrogated to the rights of a holder of a claim 
of a kind specified in subsection (a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), or (a)(9) of this section is 
not subrogated to the right of the holder of such claim to priority under such subsection.”).  
However, a subrogated creditor may be subrogated to the non-dischargeable status of the creditor’s 
claim.  See, e.g., Reitzel v. DeLong (In re DeLong), 228 B.R. 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998). 
 272.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. d (“As a matter of equitable principle the claimant is entitled via 
subrogation to every advantage afforded by the creditor’s previous rights against the defendant, but 
this starting hypothesis is subject to qualification in important respects.  The standard example of a 
further advantage that might be acquired via subrogation—apart from security and priority, normally 
the most important—is the benefit of a favorable statute of limitations; but the claimant may be 
denied this advantage if the court concludes that it derives from the status of the former creditor, 
rather than from the nature of the former obligation.”). 
 273.  See 11 U.S.C. § 509. 
 274.  See generally R3RUE § 55 (constructive trusts); id. § 56 (equitable liens). 
 275.  See id. § 57(1)(a). 
 276.  See id. § 57 cmt. (a). 
 277.  See supra note 267. 
 278.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. a (“The first requirement of the subrogation remedy, as here 
described, is that a liability in unjust enrichment be established by rules stated elsewhere in this 
Restatement.”). 
 279.  See discussion supra Part VI.A.1. 
 280.  See discussion supra Part VI.A.2. 
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significant when the obligor defendant is insolvent.  It is the benefit of a 
collateral position to which the claimant is subrogated by the rule of section 
57 of the R3RUE thus, if the defendant is able to pay, subrogation is moot.281  
In other words, when the defendant whose position has been improved by 
the claimant’s discharge of an obligation or lien cannot pay, the claimant 
takes over whatever collateral rights the third party lienor had in the assets of 
the defendant.282 
The remedy of subrogation thus diminishes the opportunity of unsecured 
or junior secured creditors to be paid in full.  Only a conclusion that such 
innocent third parties themselves would otherwise be unjustly enriched can 
justify this result.283  A comment to section 57 of the R3RUE asserts that 
“[s]ubrogation of the claimant is not prejudicial to the other creditors 
because its purpose and effect is to confirm the several claims against the 
defendant’s property in their intended priorities.”284  Yet it is not self-evident 
why “other creditors” should not benefit from the unrecorded or unperfected 
intentions of the claimant and defendant.  A better justification for the 
effects of subrogation on other creditors can be found by looking to the 
substantive law of unjust enrichment rather than searching for undisclosed 
intentions.  Section 8(2) of the R3RUE identifies a blanket rule of unjust 
enrichment that will provide many claimants seeking subrogation with the 
substantive predicate of a claim vis-à-vis other creditors.285  Funds paid to 
discharge a lien will generate a claim of unjust enrichment against other 
creditors if the claimant intended to obtain a priority interest in property and 
failed to get it because of “a mistake about title to the encumbered property, 
the existence of intervening liens, or other relevant circumstances.”286  Only 
mistake, not wrongdoing by the defendant, is required, and even negligence 
by the claimant does not make a defendant’s enrichment just.287 
Such a broad basis for unjust enrichment against innocent creditors 
 281.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. e. 
 282.  See id. § 57 cmt. a (“Subrogation becomes a meaningful remedy principally when the 
restitution claimant is in competition with general creditors of the defendant, and when the 
obligation that was satisfied with the claimant’s money enjoyed some form of priority over the 
claims of general creditors.  In the great majority of cases, the reason for subrogation is that the 
claimant’s funds have been applied to satisfy a secured claim . . . .”). 
 283.  See id. § 57 cmt. b. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  See supra text accompanying note 269. 
 286.  R3RUE § 8(2).  For an example of “no mistake, no subrogation,” see Vieira v. Pearce (In re 
Pearce), 236 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1999).  For criticism of the rule of the R3RUE, see JAMES J. 
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1322–23 (6th ed. 2010). 
 287.  See R3RUE § 5(4); see also id. § 5 cmt. f (“Because the primary function of restitution for 
benefits conferred by mistake is to rectify the consequences of error and inadvertence, any 
suggestion that restitution should be available only in cases of non-negligent mistake would be flatly 
inconsistent with the decided cases.”). 
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reveals the extent of the predisposition of the law of equity for the principle 
of property.288  However, section 57(3) of the R3RUE cuts back on the scope 
of potential unjust enrichment with a “balancing-of-the-equities” rule: “The 
remedy of subrogation may be qualified or withheld when necessary to 
avoid an inequitable result in the circumstances of a particular case.”  The 
principal example of a result sufficiently inequitable to block subrogation is 
one where “other creditors” relied on the absence of a properly filed or 
recorded lien.289  Generalizing, this is the application of the well-recognized 
rule that a bona fide purchaser, which includes a secured creditor, takes free 
of all legal or equitable claims, including claims of subrogation.290  The 
proprietary remedy recognized by equity may be trimmed by equity.291 
Subrogation claims have generally met with success in the bankruptcy 
setting.  The Eleventh Circuit has applied subrogation as a remedy to prevent 
avoidance of the interest of a refinancing mortgagee292 while the Third 
Circuit went so far as to subrogate real estate purchasers to the position of 
the mortgagee whose lien had been paid by the purchase-money lender.293  
Numerous cases have also implicitly subrogated bulk assignees of security 
interests to the position of the originally perfected secured party.294  
 288.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937) (stating virtually identical rule). 
 289.  See R3RUE § 57 cmt. b, illus. 11 (“Company borrows $50,000 from Bank to buy a new 
truck, giving Bank a security interest which Bank duly perfects.  Three years later, with the Bank 
loan in default, Company borrows $35,000 from Trust Co. on the security of the truck and uses the 
proceeds of the new loan to repay Bank.  Bank’s security interest is discharged of record, but Trust 
Co. neglects to perfect its security interest.  Six months later the Trust Co. loan is in default with a 
balance of $30,000; Company is insolvent; the court appoints Receiver to dispose of Company’s 
assets.  After the truck is sold at auction for $20,000, Receiver and Trust Co. assert competing 
claims to the proceeds in the hands of Receiver.  Trust Co.’s unperfected security interest is 
subordinate to the interest of Receiver as “lien creditor” (U.C.C. §§ 9–317(a)(2), 9–102(a)(52) (rev. 
2000)), but Trust Co. may be subrogated to the prior lien of the Bank loan that its funds were used to 
discharge.  Subrogation in such circumstances will not be permitted to prejudice third parties, such 
as subsequent lienors or creditors who rely on a misleading record title (§ 57(3)).”); see also Rinn v. 
First Union Nat’l. Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).  The subrogated claimant is, of 
course, generally subject to any defenses that the primary obligor has against the third party lienor.  
See R3RUE § 57 cmt. f. 
 290.  See R3RUE § 66; see also id. § 66 cmt. a. 
 291.  See id. § 57(3). 
 292.  Gordon v. Novastar Mortg., Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175, 1182 (11th Cir. 2008), 
amended by 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curium). 
 293.  United States v. Avila, 88 F.3d 229, 237–38 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 294.  See, e.g., Gaines v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Gaines), 414 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 
2009); Bank of N.Y. v. Leake (In re Wuerzberger), 284 B.R. 814 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (rejecting 
trustee’s claim for avoidance under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); Agric. Servs., Inc. v. 
Fitzgerald (In re Field), 263 B.R. 323 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (rejecting trustee’s claim for 
avoidance under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
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However, a series of cases from the bankruptcy courts of Vermont295 and at 
least one other state296 have denied subrogation under circumstances clearly 
within the scope of the R3RUE.  These decisions limit subrogation to cases 
of debtor misconduct rather than unjust enrichment generally, and elevate 
the principle of pari passu over the principle of property without regard to 
the law of equity.  Equity’s long-standing predisposition in favor of the 
proprietary remedy of subrogation suggests that these courts misbalanced 
matters. 
VII.  RESTITUTION (AND RESCISSION) IN CONTRACT LAW 
A.  From the Common Law 
Restitution (sometimes paired with rescission) represents a remedy for 
three distinct aspects of contract law.297  When describing a contracts 
remedy, the term “restitution” is notoriously ambiguous.  Moreover, the 
circumstances wherein restitution is appropriately understood as a 
proprietary remedy are cabined by significant limitations.298  A review of the 
scope of restitution as a contractual remedy may be helpful.  Following that 
review is a consideration of the factors that the R3RUE deems relevant for 
imposition of restitution as a proprietary remedy and why the R3RUE fails 
to overcome the principle of pari passu in bankruptcy.299 
1.  As an Alternative to Expectation 
The term “restitution” is commonly used to describe a monetary remedy 
for breach of contract.300  Restitution measures the damages of the aggrieved 
party when it is unable to establish expectation damages and has no provable 
reliance damages.301  Recovery of one’s full expectation represents the goal 
 295.  See, e.g., Bosley v. BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P.(In re Bosley), 446 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. 
Vt. 2011); In re Hutchins, 400 B.R. 403 (Bankr. D. Vt.), aff’d sub nom. Tenn. Commerce Bank v. 
Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680 (D. Vt. 2009).  The bankruptcy court in Hutchins also held that Vermont’s 
motor vehicle title statue provided the exclusive means of perfecting a security interest in a motor 
vehicle.  Hutchins, 400 B.R. at 410.  Whether preemption is correct with respect to motor vehicles, it 
is incorrect with respect to Article 9 in the First Circuit.  See Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Bos. v. New 
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 296.  See, e.g., Sheehan v. Valley Nat’l Bank (In re Shreves), 272 B.R. 614 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 
2001). 
 297.  These are as an alternative remedy to expectation damages, as a remedy for material breach, 
and as a remedy for rescission.  See infra Parts VII.A.1, VII.A.2, VII.A.4. 
 298.  See infra Parts VII.A.1–4. 
 299.  See infra Part VII.B. 
 300.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981). 
 301.  The alternative measures of contract damages are described in section 344 of the 
Restatement (Second) Contracts.  Id. § 344 (“Purposes Of Remedies: Judicial remedies under the 
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of modern contract law.302  Yet, even when proof of the benefit of the 
bargain is impossible, the aggrieved party is entitled, at the least, to get back 
her money (or the value of any other benefit conferred).303  The common law 
has long recognized that parties aggrieved by a breach of contract who could 
not prove the benefit of their bargain (the expectation measure of damages) 
could nonetheless elect to recover damages measured by the value of what 
the breacher had received.304  In an effort to reduce ambiguity, section 38 of 
the R3RUE describes this alternative measure of contract damages without 
using the term “restitution:” 
§ 38. Performance-Based Damages 
 (1) As an alternative to damages based on the expectation 
interest (Restatement Second, Contracts § 347), a plaintiff who is 
entitled to a remedy for material breach or repudiation may recover 
rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following interests of a promisee: 
(a) his ‘expectation interest,’ which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in 
as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, (b) his ‘reliance 
interest,’ which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by 
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or (c) his 
‘restitution interest,’ which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred 
on the other party.”). 
 302.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 1, intro. note (“The traditional 
goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise 
but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”).  For a discussion of contract 
theory and contract remedies, see Pryor, supra note 27, at 724–32. 
 303.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (“A party is entitled to restitution under 
the rules stated in this Restatement only to the extent that he has conferred a benefit on the other 
party by way of part performance or reliance.”); see also U.C.C. § 2–711 (“Buyer’s Remedies in 
General; Buyer’s Security Interest in Rejected Goods.  (1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or 
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any 
goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2–
612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much 
of the price as has been paid.”).  This is commonly referred to as quantum meruit.  See, e.g., Caton v. 
Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 947 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that “quantum meruit . . . is founded upon a 
theory of unjust enrichment, which ‘characterizes the result of failure to make restitution of benefits 
received . . . .”). 
 304.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (“Judicial remedies . . . serve to protect 
one or more of the following interests of a promisee: . . . (c) his ‘restitution interest,’ which is his 
interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.”); id. § 371 
(measuring the restitution interest by either the market cost to the breacher of obtaining the benefits 
received or the increase in value of the breacher’s property as a result of performance by the 
aggrieved party). 
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damages measured by the cost or value of the plaintiff’s 
performance.305 
Although labeled restitution in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
such a claim has never reflected anything more than an alternative measure 
of contract damages and has never entailed a proprietary remedy.306  
Regardless of the label for this measure of recovery, it is simply a measure 
of contract damages and does not entail any of the proprietary remedies.307  
In bankruptcy, the principle of pari passu trumps any lingering implications 
of the principle of property when an aggrieved party simply elects 
performance-based damages over the expectation measure.308  In other 
words, the claim of an aggrieved contract party is not enhanced by a 
proprietary remedy simply because it cannot prove—or elects not to seek—
the value of its defeated expectation.309 
2.  As a Remedy for Material Breach 
Second, the contract law concept of material breach310 (and 
repudiation311) permits an aggrieved party not only to proceed against the 
breacher for damages312 but also to be freed from the obligation to carry out 
 305.  Section 38 of the R3RUE goes on to provide clarity for measuring performance-based 
damages: 
(2) Performance-based damages are measured by 
 (a) uncompensated expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the contract, 
including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less 
any loss the defendant can prove with reasonable certainty the plaintiff would have 
suffered had the contract been performed (Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or 
 (b) the market value of the plaintiff’s uncompensated contractual performance, not 
exceeding the price of such performance as determined by reference to the parties’ 
agreement. 
(3) A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the rules of subsection (2) may also 
recover for any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the 
breach. 
R3RUE § 38. 
 306.  See id. 
 307.  See id. § 38 cmt. a (“Though called ‘restitution’ it [the performance-based measure of 
recovery] is simply an award of damages.”).  For a detailed comparison of the R3RUE and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts at this point, see Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual 
Context and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1007 (2011). 
 308.  See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 309.  See R3RUE § 38. 
 310.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (listing factors relevant to determining 
whether breach was material). 
 311.  See id. § 250. 
 312.  Id. § 236 (uncured and unwavied material breach gives aggrieved party claim for damages 
for total breach). 
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its unperformed contract duties.313  Discharge under the circumstances of a 
material breach gives the aggrieved party the remedy which the common law 
historically called rescission.314  The aggrieved party is entitled to full 
compensation for the benefit of its bargain,315 but because it is often difficult 
to value the expectation interest after a material breach at an intermediate 
stage of contract performance, the aggrieved party may seek restitution of 
any benefit it has conferred on the breaching party.316  Paralleling the 
alternative remedy of restitution for a simple breach of contract,317 section 37 
of the R3RUE318 specifies the availability of rescission and monetary 
restitution for material breach.  Like the aggrieved party’s choice to pursue 
performance-based damages for an ordinary breach of contract, the victim of 
a material breach has the option to seek such damages.319  Given that 
 313.  See id. § 237 (describing effect of material breach as failure of condition); id. § 225(2) 
(providing that failure of condition discharges contractual obligations of aggrieved party).  Contract 
law does, however, recognize a limited duty to perform on the part of the aggrieved party when the 
parties’ reciprocal performances can be paired as “agreed equivalents.”  See id. § 240.  See generally 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 11.18(a) (6th ed. 2009). 
 314.  See U.C.C. § 2–106(4) (2004) (cancellation as a remedy); id. § 2–608 (“Revocation of 
Acceptance in Whole or in Part”).  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts avoided the term 
rescission but the drafters of the R3RUE have brought it back into the restatement lexicon.  See, e.g., 
R3RUE §§ 1 cmt. c, 37(a). 
 315.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts calls this “damages for total breach.”  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243 (“Effect of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving 
Rise to a Claim for Damages for Total Breach”): 
(1) With respect to performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, a 
breach by non-performance gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach only if it 
discharges the injured party’s remaining duties to render such performance, other than a 
duty to render an agreed equivalent under § 240. 
 316.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 373 (“Restitution When Other Party Is In Breach”): 
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), on a breach by non-performance that gives 
rise to a claim for damages for total breach or on a repudiation, the injured party is 
entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of 
part performance or reliance. 
 317.  See supra text accompanying notes 312–14. 
 318.  R3RUE § 37 (“Rescission For Material Breach”); see infra Appendix A. 
 319.  Id.  A comment to section 37 of the R3RUE also notes that this will be a “relatively 
uncommon remedy,” presumably because even a short lapse of time generally makes it difficult to 
unwind contractual performance.  R3RUE § 37 cmt. a.  Restitution for material breach or repudiation 
also requires the claimant to restore anything it has received, which may further reduce its utility: 
So long as it is possible as a practical matter to order that the plaintiff’s performance be 
restored in specie, it will usually be easier to do so than to calculate damages for breach 
or to compel the defendant to complete the interrupted exchange. . . .  A plaintiff who 
would rather unwind a partly-completed exchange than force it ahead is given the 
election to do so—though only when unwinding is a practical alternative. 
Id. 
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restitution for a material breach is merely a limited monetary remedy, 
however, the principle of pari passu should control in insolvency 
proceedings. 
3.  As the Result of Rescission 
There is a third use of the term restitution in the realm of contracts, one 
which the drafters of the R3RUE believe entails a proprietary remedy.320  It 
is employed where the aggrieved party has a right to restitution of benefits 
conferred on the other party after successfully exercising a power to avoid a 
contract.321  In other words, restitution as a remedy for rescission of a “non-
contract.”  The power to avoid an otherwise formally valid contract typically 
arises due to a defect in one of the contracting parties,322 as a result of a 
defective process of contracting,323 or because a contract is unenforceable for 
a reason arising apart from the bargain itself.324  Elsewhere I have 
characterized such grounds under the rubrics of the existential, the 
situational, and the normative.325  The Restatement (Second) Contracts 
explicitly acknowledges the remedy of restitution when a contract is 
rescinded because of mistake326 or unenforceable because of the Statute of 
Frauds.327  On the other hand, it recognizes that restitution is generally not 
available when public policy prohibits performance of a contract.328  
 320.  See R3RUE ch. 4, Introductory Note, at 479 (“Claims of this kind are logically part of the 
law of restitution, not contract, because they supply a remedy based on the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment in cases where contract law explicitly denies a claim.”). 
 321.  Id.  Here too contract law creates ambiguity by using avoidance and rescission as virtual 
synonyms. 
 322.  The heading for a short series of specific grounds of avoidance is incapacity.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (“Capacity To Contract”). 
 323.  In this area, courts have identified at least five specific grounds for avoidance.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (mutual mistake); id. § 153 (unilateral mistake); id. 
§ 164 (misrepresentation); id. § 175 (duress); id. § 177 (undue influence). 
 324.  Two grounds exemplify non-contractual reasons to bar enforcement of a bargain: the Statute 
of Frauds and public policy.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (Statute of 
Frauds); id. § 178 (public policy).  Section 31 of the R3RUE also includes contracts that fail for 
indefiniteness in this category.  R3RUE § 31 cmt. d. 
 325.  See C. Scott Pryor, Consideration in the Common Law of Contracts: A Biblical-Theological 
Critique, 18 REGENT U.L. REV. 1, 12–18 (2005). 
 326.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158 (“Relief Including Restitution”): 
(1) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, either party may have a claim 
for relief including restitution under the rules stated in §§ 240 and 376. 
 327.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375 (“Restitution When Contract Is Within 
Statute of Frauds: A party who would otherwise have a claim in restitution under a contract is not 
barred from restitution for the reason that the contract is unenforceable by him because of the Statute 
of Frauds unless the Statute provides otherwise or its purpose would be frustrated by allowing 
restitution.”). 
 328.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (“Restitution Generally Unavailable: 
Except as stated in §§ 198 and 199, a party has no claim in restitution for performance that he has 
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Restitution for other occasions of rescission is covered by the catch-all 
provision of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.329 
It is here—where restitution is the remedy for “non-contracts”—that the 
potential for proprietary remedies is stronger.  On the one hand, it is difficult 
to conceptualize a place for the principle of property where restitution is 
deployed simply as a remedy for breach of contract.330  The primacy of the 
principle of pari passu in such situations is reinforced by the nature of the 
risk assumed whenever contract is employed.  The law presumes that 
contract parties are routinely taking a risk that their counterparty will not 
perform subject to the legal “backstop” of monetary damages.331  There is 
little reason to afford an aggrieved contract party a proprietary remedy when 
he has voluntarily assumed a risk of non-performance.  But, on the other 
hand, the same calculus does not obtain where there is no contract or, more 
accurately, when a contract has been rescinded.  The status of ownership of 
property may well have characterized the position of one or both of the 
parties before entering into the failed contract.  If so, the R3RUE provides 
for a presumption that it should continue (or resume) with respect to that 
property after (or upon) avoidance. 
4.  As a Remedy for Rescission 
The efforts of the drafters of the R3RUE to address the multifaceted 
used of the term “restitution” in connection with all three aspects of contract 
law explains the complexity of section 54 of the R3RUE.332  The length of 
section 54 is double that of the rules for application of the other proprietary 
remedies—constructive trust,333 equitable lien,334 and subrogation.335 
rendered under or in return for a promise that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless 
denial of restitution would cause disproportionate forfeiture.”). 
 329.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 (“Restitution when Contract is 
Voidable: A party who has avoided a contract on the ground of lack of capacity, mistake, 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or abuse of a fiduciary relation is entitled to restitution 
for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.”). 
 330.  See supra text accompanying notes 311–26. 
 331.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 1 (discussing the 
purposes of remedies in general). 
 332.  R3RUE § 54 (“Rescission and Restitution”); see infra Appendix A. 
 333.  See R3RUE § 55. 
 334.  See id. § 56. 
 335.  See id. § 57. 
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The complexity of section 54 of the R3RUE speaks to its multiple 
applications.336  Where a claimant is unable to prove the benefit of its 
bargain, only fairness and judicial economy justify restitution of the benefits 
provided to the defendant.337  The warrant for a proprietary remedy fails to 
overcome the principle of pari passu when there is no substantive claim of 
unjust enrichment.338  Additionally, even a breaching defendant may be 
prejudiced when an aggrieved party seeks to rescind a subsisting contract 
due to material breach and obtain restitution in lieu of expectation 
damages.339  Thus, even in the context of the parties to the contract, breach 
alone—even if material—does not entail a proprietary remedy in the face of 
countervailing interests.  It follows that the principle of pari passu will have 
priority in an insolvency context.  Notwithstanding a claimant’s inability to 
collect monetary damages due to the defendant’s insolvency, the assumption 
of the risk of non-performance inherent in contract minimizes the warrant 
for a proprietary remedy340—an assumption that forms the backdrop to the 
baseline remedial provision of the Bankruptcy Code that address executory 
contracts.341 
 336.  See id. § 54 cmt. b: 
[T]he complex rules traditionally associated with the remedy of rescission and restitution 
derive mostly from transactions in which (i) the parties are bound by a valid and 
enforceable contract, (ii) the claimant prefers rescission to damages, yet (iii) rescission is 
potentially prejudicial to the other party, costly in terms of judicial resources, or both. 
 337.  See id. § 54 cmt. e: 
[W]hen rescission affords an alternative remedy for breach of a valid and enforceable 
contract (as permitted by the rule of § 37)—a breach, in other words, that might be 
remedied by damages or specific performance—the effect and the justification of the 
rescission remedy are significantly different.  Rescission in such a case permits the 
injured party to make a fundamental election, choosing to go backward (to the status quo 
ante) instead of forward (by enforcement of the contractual exchange). . . .  Unlike the 
case of rescission for fraud or mistake, the justification of rescission as an alternative 
remedy for breach is not the avoidance of unjust enrichment, but a concern with fairness 
to the injured party combined with remedial economy. 
 338.  See Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 576 (2006) (“Restitution 
as a remedy for breach is not concerned with unjust enrichment.”). 
 339.  R3RUE § 54 cmt. c (“Rescission of a valid and enforceable contract overturns legitimate 
contractual expectations on which both parties may have significantly relied.”); see also Kull, 
Rescission and Restitution, supra note 338, at 577 (“[I]f the contract calls for a complex and 
inherently irreversible performance . . . and if the parties have already performed for a number of 
years, it is probably idle to think in terms of rescission—simply because it is impossible to 
unscramble the egg.”). 
 340.  See R3RUE § 54 cmt. c (“Rescission as an alternative remedy for material breach—if 
unrestricted by the requirement of counter-restitution—would thus give the plaintiff in effect an 
option on the defendant’s performance, rather than enforceable rights under a bilateral obligation.”). 
 341.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006): 
Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract 
or lease— 
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By contrast, where the substantive law of contracts permits avoidance of 
the contract, assignment of the risk of non-performance to the claimant is not 
as easily justified.342  Limiting the recovery of such a claimant by the 
principle of pari passu is in tension with the power to rescind.343  A 
proprietary remedy is appropriate where there is no subsisting contract and 
the defendant has been unjustly enriched.344  Logically, the principle of 
property might be deemed to protect the proprietary remedy even in the face 
of the defendant’s insolvency.  However, even in situations where a contract 
may be avoided, the voluntary nature of the claimant’s circumstances 
weakens the justification for a proprietary remedy.345  In other words, courts 
treat parties to “non-contracts” as if they had assumed the risk of 
nonperformance inherent in contracts generally when creditors of the 
defendant would pay the price.346 
But for the limited rights of reclamation under section 2–702 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code,347 a seller who has sold goods on credit does not 
(1) If such contract or lease has not been assumed . . . immediately before the date 
of the filing of the petition. 
Other subsections of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code provide special protections for certain aggrieved 
non-debtor contract parties.  11 U.S.C. § 365.  None, however, provide a proprietary remedy for 
avoidable contracts.  Id. 
 342.  See R3RUE § 54 cmt. c. 
 343.  See id. § 54. 
 344.  See id. (observing that section 54 of R3RUE liberalizes the requirement of counter-
restitution when the claimant’s entry into a contract has been procured by fraud or mistake “because 
the underlying exchange is ineffective to determine the parties’ respective entitlements.”); see also 
id. § 54 cmt. d: 
 Rescission of defective agreements.  When it extricates the claimant from a defective 
agreement, rescission reverses a transfer that lacks an adequate legal basis and prevents 
the unjustified enrichment that would otherwise result on either side.  Concern for the 
stability of the contractual exchange has no relevance to such a case, because there is no 
valid exchange to protect.  Specific restitution is required to the extent feasible . . . . 
 345.  Cf. R3RUE § 54(4)(c) (denying restitution for rescission where “rights of innocent third 
parties” would be “prejudiced”), with R3RUE § 66 (denying restitution in connection with other 
proprietary remedies only if there is a subsequent purchaser for value); see also id. § 54 cmt. k: 
[I]f a claimant were permitted to entertain for any significant period an election between 
enforcement and avoidance—against a background of potentially fluctuating values—the 
availability of rescission would give the claimant, in effect, an unpaid option on the 
defendant’s performance. . . .  The opportunistic use of rescission is barred, within 
traditional doctrine, by a rule that a claimant seeking to rescind must give notice of the 
election to do so with reasonable promptness after learning of the grounds for rescission. 
 346.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372 cmt. b (1981) (“A court may also refuse 
specific restitution if it would otherwise cause injustice as where, for example, it would result in a 
preference over other creditors in bankruptcy.”). 
 347.  U.C.C. § 2–702 (2011) (“Seller’s Remedies on Discovery of Buyer’s Insolvency”): 
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except for 
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have the power to cancel a contract and reacquire transferred property upon 
the buyer’s insolvency.348  Even less does the common law of contracts 
provide a restitutionary remedy on account of a contract party’s 
insolvency.349  Without the right of rescission, there cannot be a right of 
specific restitution and, hence, no predicate for a proprietary remedy: there 
has been no unjust enrichment.350  The aggrieved contract party has a claim 
in damages and may be able to suspend its performance351 but retains no 
interest in specific property sold to the now-insolvent party.352  In other 
words, the common law lets the risk of insolvency fall to the solvent 
counter-party, not the creditors of the debtor. 
B.  Into Bankruptcy 
While the restitutionary measure of recovery resulting from rescission 
has received limited recognition in bankruptcy, the proprietary remedy has 
received none.353  As an example of the first situation, bankruptcy courts in 
Ponzi-scheme cases have regularly recognized an offset measured by the 
restitutionary interest.354  The typical scenario is an action by the trustee of 
the now-bankrupt Ponzi scheme to recover payouts to investors as fraudulent 
transfers under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.355  At least in the Ninth 
cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop 
delivery under this Article (Section 2–705). 
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent 
he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if 
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within 
three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.  Except as provided in 
this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer’s fraudulent 
or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay. 
(3) The seller’s right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in 
ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403).  
Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them. 
 348.  See R3RUE § 37(2) (“Rescission as a remedy for breach of contract is not available against 
a defendant whose defaulted obligation is exclusively an obligation to pay money.”).  See generally 
Knox v. Phoenix Leasing, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 349.  The common law of contracts provides for specific restitution in limited circumstances.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372; see generally PERILLO, supra note 313, at § 15.5. 
 350.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372. 
 351.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 252(1) (“Where the obligor’s insolvency 
gives the obligee reasonable grounds to believe that the obligor will commit a breach . . . the obligee 
may suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he 
receives assurance . . . .”).  Contract parties can protect themselves by retaining or taking a security 
interest to secure the obligor’s duty of payment or performance.  See U.C.C. § 9–201. 
 352.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 252 cmt. a. 
 353.  See generally Duggan, supra note 66. 
 354.  See, e.g., Soul e v. Alliot (In re Tiger Petroleum Co.), 319 B.R. 225, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 
2004). 
 355.  See, e.g., Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623, 626–27 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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Circuit, the existence of a Ponzi scheme conclusively establishes that the 
debtor made a transfer with “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” its 
creditors.356  Thus, the trustee is entitled to recover all distributions from the 
debtor to the scheme’s transferees.357  However, § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides a defense to the extent that a good-faith transferee gave 
“value” to the debtor.358  Bankruptcy courts have concluded that a 
transferee’s initial investment to the scheme may qualify as value.359  
Because such an investment is typically induced by fraud, the transferee 
could have rescinded it and would have been entitled to a claim for 
restitution of the amount of the investment.360  Courts have concluded that 
this restitution claim should be deemed to be “reasonably equivalent value” 
for an equivalent portion of any distributions received from the scheme.361 
This analysis is consistent with the R3RUE.  Section 13 of the R3RUE 
justifies a claim of rescission to the extent of an innocent claimant’s 
investment in a Ponzi scheme.362  It also warrants restitution as a remedy.363  
Conversely, claims of unjust enrichment against even innocent transferees 
from a Ponzi scheme are authorized in section 58 of the R3RUE.364  In 
addition, section 59 of the R3RUE provides that multiple restitution 
claimants from an insolvent fraudster must share pro-rata to the extent of 
their restitution claims.365  Sharing is a shortcut when restitution claims are 
 356.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners–A (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc.), 
916 F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 357.  See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 358.  See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006): 
 (c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is 
voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a 
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any 
interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the 
extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such 
transfer or obligation. 
 359.  See Perkins, 661 F.3d at 627; see also Donnell, 533 F.3d at 772. 
 360.  See, e.g., Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 708 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 361.  Donell, 533 F.3d at 772 (“Payments up to the amount of the initial investment are considered 
to be exchanged for ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ and thus not fraudulent, because they 
proportionally reduce the investors’ rights to restitution.” (citation omitted)). 
 362.  R3RUE § 13. 
 363.  Id. 
 364.  R3RUE § 58 (“(2) A claimant entitled to restitution from property or its traceable product 
may assert the same rights against any subsequent transferee who is not a bona fide purchaser (§ 66) 
or a bona fide payee (§ 67).”). 
 365.  Id. § 59 (“(4) If a fund contains the property of multiple restitution claimants (such as the 
victims of successive fraud by the recipient): (a) Each claimant’s interest in the fund and any product 
thereof is determined by the proportion that such claimant’s contributions bear to the balance of the 
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indistinguishable; however, the R3RUE provides a number of fine-grained 
rules by which to distinguish among competing restitution claims.366  In fact, 
the R3RUE’s principle-based rules can usefully supplement purely statutory 
judicial analysis of complex Ponzi-scheme cases.367  The law of equity 
provides a backdrop to the generalities of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The fourth propriety remedy identified by the R3RUE—rescission and 
restitution—arises from an avoidable contract.368  The absence of reported 
bankruptcy cases recognizing restitution simply on account of the power to 
avoid is telling.  Despite its apparent breadth, section 54 of the R3RUE must 
be coupled with something more, like a constructive trust, when third parties 
are involved.369  With respect to creditors, a claimant must establish an 
independent ground for rescission,370 the right of restitution vis-à-vis the 
defendant, and that the creditors would be unjustly enriched.  Moreover, a 
claimant must convince the court that it could not have employed a security 
device to recover property when it seeks to reverse a transfer of property 
over the objections of the defendant’s creditors.371 
While section 2–702 of the Uniform Commercial Code372 authorizes a 
limited right of reclamation of goods sold to an insolvent buyer, in 
bankruptcy such restitutionary claims have been uncritically treated as debts 
and not as proprietary interests.373  The failure of bankruptcy courts or 
fund upon each contribution and withdrawal, but only if the accounting necessary to this calculation 
can be established without using the presumptions or marshaling rules of § 59(2).  (b) If the evidence 
does not permit the court to distinguish the interests of multiple restitution claimants by reference to 
actual transactions, such claimants recover ratably from the fund and any product thereof in 
proportion to their respective losses.”). 
 366.  See id. § 59 cmt. g (“Granting the obvious equity of treating like cases alike, it is important 
to recognize the many ways in which claimants who are similarly situated—insofar as they are 
equally innocent victims of equivalent wrongdoing—may nevertheless obtain widely different relief 
in restitution.  The law of unjust enrichment does not impose a rule of contribution or loss-sharing 
between the victims of common or related injuries, and individual outcomes will frequently depend 
on the circumstances that determine whether a particular claimant’s assets (or their traceable 
product) may be identified in the property available for distribution.”). 
 367.  See Andrew Kull, Common-Law Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
939 (2012); see generally Mallory A. Sullivan, Note, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary 
Distribution of Assets After Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1589, 1601–
10 (2011) (describing fictions used to trace Ponzi-scheme assets claimed by creditors and 
circumstances justifying suspension of those fictions in favor of pro rata distributions). 
 368.  See supra text accompanying notes 341–54. 
 369.  See R3RUE § 54 cmt. a (“[A] claimant who seeks to reacquire an asset in priority to the 
defendant’s creditor will usually ask the court to decree a rescission in conjunction with some further 
remedy such as constructive trust.”). 
 370.  See id. 
 371.  R3RUE § 54 cmt. a (“Even if the defendant’s breach involves something beyond a failure to 
pay money, a court will refuse to grant the claimant a retroactive priority—to the prejudice of third 
parties—that might have been acquired by contract, employing the ordinary modes of security.”). 
 372.  See supra note 347. 
 373.  See, e.g., Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 595 (9th 
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apparently even parties to consider the possibility of the proprietary remedy 
of rescission and restitution speaks to a point made earlier: restitution, even 
on account of an avoidable contract, is simply an alternative to promote 
judicial efficiency.374  The close nexus between the right of rescission and 
contract warrants subordinating this equitable principle of property to the 
principle of pari passu. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The R3RUE is not the law of equity; however, it will go far to clarify 
the law of equity in many states.  Cases addressing the predicates of unjust 
enrichment and its remedies are generally old and often their presuppositions 
are unexplained.  The decline of formal study of equity has left most judges 
and practicing lawyers without knowledge of what constitutes unjust 
enrichment.  The R3RUE makes that nearly lost body of knowledge 
accessible.  Sooner or later the effects of this clarification will be observed 
in bankruptcy jurisprudence. 
The moralistic cast of decisions in equity from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries jars the modern ear.  Reconceptualization of unjust 
enrichment as unjustified enrichment—and the provision of reasonably clear 
rules to identify when it exists—will allay the contemporary fear of overt 
morality in the private law sphere.375  The R3RUE will make assertions that 
equity’s proprietary interests are “mere remedies” untenable. 
The four proprietary remedies for unjust enrichment are clarified in the 
R3RUE.  More importantly, and with the exception of rescission and 
restitution, the R3RUE states a cogent basis for three of the proprietary 
remedies in bankruptcy; it also provides a clear rule for tracing and a well-
defined statement of defenses.  Equally with the common law’s recognition 
of legal interests in property, the law of equity warrants recognition of the 
principle of property.  The countervailing bankruptcy principle of pari passu 
should not, without evidence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, 
simply be assumed to have priority.376 
Cir. 1991) (discussing meaning of “antecedent debt” as defense to fraudulent conveyance claim). 
 374.  See supra text accompanying notes 346–49 . 
 375.  One might argue that the contemporary phobia of morality is exaggerated.  As James Rogers 
puts it, “Perhaps part of the reason that the law of restitution can get away with expressing its basic 
concept in such starkly moralistic language is a fairly simple point.  The basic principle of the law of 
restitution is simple.”  See Rogers, supra note 3, at 1393–94. 
 376.  See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (“When Congress amends the bankruptcy 
laws, it does not write ‘on a clean slate.’”). 
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Of the four proprietary remedies, reconfiguration of constructive trust 
should have the greatest impact in bankruptcy.  The judicial penchant of 
characterizing constructive trust as a “mere” remedy should be eliminated.  
Courts should jettison rhetorical flourishes suggesting that constructive trust 
is inconsistent with the policy of bankruptcy.  Equitable liens and 
subrogation should find themselves on firmer analytical footing, and 
precedent avoiding any of the proprietary remedies should be reconsidered.  
Notwithstanding the R3RUE, however, bankruptcy courts are unlikely to 
recognize the paired set of rescission and restitution as creating a proprietary 
remedy.  The nexus of the pair to contract, with contract’s inherent element 
of risk, will continue to warrant priority for the principle of pari passu. 
While the law of equity remains a living part of state common law 
jurisprudence, contemporary American bankruptcy law and practice threaten 
to submerge equity’s proprietary remedies in a pool of ignorance.  If nothing 
else, the R3RUE will provide a rope for equity’s rescue. 
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IX.  APPENDIX A—SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
R3RUE § 4.  Restitution May Be Legal or Equitable or Both 
(1) Liabilities and remedies within the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment may have originated in law, in equity, or in a 
combination of the two. 
(2) A claimant otherwise entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment, 
including a remedy originating in equity, need not demonstrate the 
inadequacy of available remedies at law. 
R3RUE § 5.  Invalidating Mistake 
(1) A transfer induced by invalidating mistake is subject to 
rescission and restitution.  The transferee is liable in restitution as 
necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.  Particular instances of 
restitution for mistake are described in §§ 6–12 and 34. 
(2) An invalidating mistake may be a misapprehension of either fact 
or law.  There is invalidating mistake only when 
(a) but for the mistake the transaction in question would not 
have taken place; and 
(b) the claimant does not bear the risk of the mistake. 
(3) A claimant bears the risk of a mistake when 
(a) the risk is allocated to the claimant by agreement of the 
parties; 
(b) the claimant has consciously assumed the risk by deciding 
to act in the face of a recognized uncertainty; or 
(c) allocation to the claimant of the risk in question accords 
with the common understanding of the transaction concerned. 
(4) A claimant does not bear the risk of a mistake merely because 
the mistake results from the claimant’s negligence. 
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R3RUE § 7.  Mistaken Performance of Another’s Obligation 
Mistaken performance of another’s obligation gives the performing 
party a claim in restitution against the obligor to the extent of the 
benefit mistakenly conferred on the obligor. 
R3RUE § 8.  Mistaken Discharge of Obligation or Lien 
(1) Mistaken discharge by an obligee of an obligation or the security 
therefor [sic] gives the obligee a claim in restitution by 
reinstatement of the rights mistakenly surrendered. 
(2) If the use of the claimant’s funds to discharge a lien confers an 
unintended benefit on another person as the result of the claimant’s 
mistake about title to the encumbered property, the existence of 
intervening liens, or other relevant circumstances, the claimant is 
entitled to restitution via subrogation to the discharged lien 
(§57(1)(a)) as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. 
R3RUE § 13.  Fraud and Misrepresentation 
(1) A transfer induced by fraud or material misrepresentation is 
subject to rescission and restitution.  The transferee is liable in 
restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. 
(2) A transfer induced by fraud is void if the transferor had neither 
knowledge of, nor reasonable opportunity to learn, the character of 
the resulting transfer or its essential terms.  Otherwise the transferee 
obtains voidable title. 
R3RUE § 14.  Duress 
(1) Duress is coercion that is wrongful as a matter of law. 
(2) A transfer induced by duress is subject to rescission and 
restitution.  The transferee is liable in restitution as necessary to 
avoid unjust enrichment. 
(3) If the effect of duress is tantamount to physical compulsion, a 
transfer induced by duress is void.  If not, a transfer induced by 
duress conveys voidable title. 
R3RUE § 15.  Undue Influence 
(1) Undue influence is excessive and unfair persuasion, sufficient to 
overcome the free will of the transferor, between parties who 
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occupy either a confidential relation or a relation of dominance on 
one side and subservience on the other. 
(2) A transfer induced by undue influence is subject to rescission 
and restitution.  The transferee is liable in restitution as necessary to 
avoid unjust enrichment. 
R3RUE § 16.  Incapacity of Transferor 
(1) A transfer by a person lacking requisite legal capacity is subject 
to rescission and restitution unless ratified.  The transferee is liable 
in restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by statute: 
(a) A transfer by a minor confers voidable title. 
(b) When a transfer is challenged on the ground of mental 
capacity: 
(i) if at the time of the transfer the transferor’s incapacity 
has been adjudicated and is continuing, the transfer is void; 
(ii) if the transferor’s incapacity is only adjudicated 
thereafter, the transfer confers voidable title. 
(c) When a transfer is challenged on the ground that a transferor 
such as a municipal corporation or government agency has 
acted outside the scope of its statutory authority: 
(i) a transfer wholly beyond the powers of the transferor is 
void; 
(ii) a transfer which is potentially within the scope of the 
transferor’s powers, but which is invalid for defective 
authorization or execution, confers voidable title. 
(3) If the transferee has dealt with the transferor in good faith on 
reasonable terms, then notwithstanding the transferor’s incapacity 
(a) rescission and restitution leaves the transferor liable in 
restitution for benefits received in the transaction, as provided 
in §§ 33 and 54; and 
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(b) the court may qualify or deny the right to rescission to avoid 
an inequitable result (§54(6)). 
R3RUE § 17.  Lack of Authority 
A transfer by an agent, trustee, or other fiduciary outside the scope 
of the transferor’s authority, or otherwise in breach of the 
transferor’s duty to the principal or beneficiary, is subject to 
rescission and restitution.  The transferee is liable in restitution to 
the principal or beneficiary as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. 
R3RUE § 20.  Protection of Another’s Life or Health 
(1) A person who performs, supplies, or obtains professional 
services required for the protection of another’s life or health is 
entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision to intervene 
without request. 
(2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by a 
reasonable charge for the services in question. 
R3RUE § 21.  Protection of Another’s Property 
(1) A person who takes effective action to protect another’s 
property from threatened harm is entitled to restitution from the 
other as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the 
circumstances justify the decision to intervene without request.  
Unrequested intervention is justified only when it is reasonable to 
assume the owner would wish the action performed. 
(2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by the loss 
avoided or by a reasonable charge for the services provided, 
whichever is less. 
R3RUE § 22.  Performance of Another’s Duty 
(1) A person who performs another’s duty to a third person or to the 
public is entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to 
prevent unjust enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision 
to intervene without request. 
(2) Unrequested intervention may be justified in the following 
circumstances: 
(a) the claimant may be justified in paying another’s money 
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debt if there is no prejudice to the obligor in substituting a 
liability in restitution for the original obligation; 
(b) the claimant may be justified in performing another’s duty 
to furnish necessaries to a third person, to avoid imminent harm 
to the interests of the third person; and 
(c) the claimant may be justified in performing another’s duty 
to the public, if performance is urgently required for the 
protection of public health, safety, or general welfare. 
(3) There is no unjust enrichment and no claim in restitution by the 
rule of this section except insofar as the claimant’s intervention has 
relieved the defendant of an otherwise enforceable obligation. 
R3RUE § 23.  Performance of a Joint Obligation (Indemnity and 
Contribution) 
(1) If the claimant renders to a third person a performance for which 
claimant and defendant are jointly and severally liable, the claimant 
is entitled to restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent 
unjust enrichment. 
(2) There is unjust enrichment in such a case to the extent that 
(a) the effect of the claimant’s intervention is to reduce an 
enforceable obligation of the defendant to the third person, and 
(b) as between the claimant and the defendant, the obligation 
discharged (or the part thereof for which the claimant seeks 
restitution) was primarily the responsibility of the defendant. 
R3RUE § 24.  Performance of an Independent Obligation (Equitable 
Subrogation) 
(1) If the claimant renders to a third person a performance for which 
the defendant would have been independently liable to the third 
person, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant as 
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. 
(2) There is unjust enrichment in such a case to the extent that 
(a) the claimant acts in the performance of the claimant’s 
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independent obligation to the third person, or otherwise in the 
reasonable protection of the claimant’s own interests; and 
(b) as between the claimant and the defendant, the performance 
in question (or the part thereof for which the claimant seeks 
restitution) is primarily the obligation of the defendant. 
R3RUE § 26.  Protection of Claimant’s Property 
If the claimant incurs necessary expense to protect an interest in 
property and in so doing confers an economic benefit on another 
person in consequence of the other’s interest in the same property, 
the claimant is entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to 
prevent unjust enrichment. 
R3RUE § 28.  Unmarried Cohabitants 
(1) If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship 
resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to 
which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions 
in the form of property or services, the person making such 
contributions has a claim in restitution against the owner as 
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the 
relationship. 
(2) The rule of subsection (1) may be displaced, modified, or 
supplemented by local domestic relations law. 
R3RUE § 31.  Unenforceability 
(1) A person who renders performance under an agreement that 
cannot be enforced against the recipient by reason of 
(a) indefiniteness, or 
(b) the failure to satisfy an extrinsic requirement of 
enforceability such as the Statute of Frauds, 
has a claim in restitution against the recipient as necessary to 
prevent unjust enrichment.  There is no unjust enrichment if the 
claimant receives the counterperformance specified by the parties’ 
unenforceable agreement. 
(2) There is no claim under this section if enforcement of the 
agreement is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, nor in 
any other case in which the allowance of restitution would defeat 
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the policy of the law that makes the agreement unenforceable.  
Restitution is appropriate except to the extent that forfeiture is an 
intended or acceptable consequence of unenforceability. 
R3RUE § 32.  Illegality 
A person who renders performance under an agreement that is 
illegal or otherwise unenforceable for reasons of public policy may 
obtain restitution from the recipient in accordance with the 
following rules: 
(1) Restitution will be allowed, whether or not necessary to prevent 
unjust enrichment, if restitution is required by the policy of the 
underlying prohibition. 
(2) Restitution will also be allowed, as necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment, if the allowance of restitution will not defeat or 
frustrate the policy of the underlying prohibition.  There is no unjust 
enrichment if the claimant receives the counterperformance 
specified by the parties’ unenforceable agreement. 
(3) Restitution will be denied, notwithstanding the enrichment of 
the defendant at the claimant’s expense, if a claim under subsection 
(2) is foreclosed by the claimant’s inequitable conduct (§ 63). 
R3RUE § 33.  Incapacity of Recipient 
(1) A person who renders performance under an agreement that is 
unenforceable by reason of the other party’s legal incapacity has a 
claim in restitution against the recipient as necessary to prevent 
unjust enrichment.  There is no unjust enrichment if the claimant 
receives the counterperformance specified by the parties’ 
unenforceable agreement. 
(2) Restitution under this section is available only to a person who 
has dealt with the recipient in good faith on reasonable terms. 
(3) Notwithstanding the unjust enrichment of the recipient, 
restitution may be limited or denied if it would be inconsistent with 
the protection that the doctrine of incapacity is intended to afford in 
the circumstances of the case. 
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R3RUE § 34.  Mistake or Supervening Change of Circumstances 
(1) A person who renders performance under a contract that is 
subject to avoidance by reason of mistake or supervening change of 
circumstances has a claim in restitution to recover the performance 
or its value, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.  If the case is 
one in which the requirements of § 54 can be met, the remedy of 
rescission and restitution permits the reversal of the transaction 
without the need to demonstrate unjust enrichment. 
(2) For purposes of subsection (1): 
(a) the value of a nonreturnable contractual performance is 
measured by reference to the recipient’s contractual 
expectations; and 
(b) the recipient’s liability in restitution may be reduced to 
allow for loss incurred in reliance on the contract. 
R3RUE § 36.  Restitution to a Party in Default 
(1) A performing party whose material breach prevents a recovery 
on the contract has a claim in restitution against the recipient of 
performance, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. 
(2) Enrichment from receipt of an incomplete or defective 
contractual performance is measured by comparison to the 
recipient’s position had the contract been fully performed.  The 
claimant has the burden of establishing the fact and amount of any 
net benefit conferred. 
(3) A claim under this section may be displaced by a valid 
agreement of the parties establishing their rights and remedies in the 
event of default. 
(4) If the claimant’s default involves fraud or other inequitable 
conduct, restitution may on that account be denied (§ 63). 
R3RUE § 37.  Rescission for Material Breach 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a plaintiff who is entitled 
to a remedy for the defendant’s material breach or repudiation may 
choose rescission as an alternative to enforcement if the further 
requirements of § 54 can be met. 
(2) Rescission as a remedy for breach of contract is not available 
01 PRYOR SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:26 PM 
[Vol. 40: 843, 2013] Third Time’s the Charm 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
903 
against a defendant whose defaulted obligation is exclusively an 
obligation to pay money. 
R3RUE § 40.  Trespass, Conversion, and Comparable Wrongs 
A person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or conversion, 
by comparable interference with other protected interests in tangible 
property, or in consequence of such an act by another, is liable in 
restitution to the victim of the wrong. 
R3RUE § 41.  Misappropriation of Financial Assets 
A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriating financial assets, 
or in consequence of their misappropriation by another, is liable in 
restitution to the victim of the wrong. 
R3RUE § 42.  Interference with Intellectual Property and Similar Rights 
A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or infringement 
of another’s legally protected rights in any idea, expression, 
information, image, or designation is liable in restitution to the 
holder of such rights. 
R3RUE § 43.  Fiduciary or Confidential Relation 
A person who obtains a benefit 
(a) in breach of a fiduciary duty, 
(b) in breach of an equivalent duty imposed by a relation of trust 
and confidence, or 
(c) in consequence of another’s breach of such a duty, 
is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed. 
R3RUE § 48.  Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better Right 
If a third person makes a payment to the defendant to which (as 
between claimant and defendant) the claimant has a better legal or 
equitable right, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the 
defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. 
R3RUE § 50.  Innocent Recipient 
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(1) An “innocent recipient” is one who commits no misconduct in 
the transaction concerned (§ 51) and who bears no responsibility for 
the unjust enrichment in question (§ 52). 
(2) If nonreturnable benefits would be susceptible of different 
valuations by the standards identified in § 49(3), the liability of an 
innocent recipient is determined as follows: 
(a) Unjust enrichment from unrequested benefits is measured 
by the standard that yields the smallest liability in restitution. 
(b) Unjust enrichment from requested benefits is measured by 
their reasonable value to the recipient.  Reasonable value is 
normally the lesser of market value and a price the recipient has 
expressed a willingness to pay. 
(c) Reasonable value may be measured by a more restrictive 
standard if the validity of the recipient’s assent is in question (§ 
49(3)(d)); if the claimant has not performed as requested (§ 36); 
or if prevailing prices include an element of profit that the court 
decides to withhold from the claimant. 
(3) The liability in restitution of an innocent recipient of 
unrequested benefits may not leave the recipient worse off (apart 
from the costs of litigation) than if the transaction giving rise to the 
liability had not occurred. 
(4) The liability in restitution of an innocent recipient of 
unrequested benefits may not exceed the cost to the claimant of 
conferring the benefits in question, supplemented when appropriate 
by the rules of § 53. 
(5) An innocent recipient may be liable in an appropriate case for 
use value or proceeds, but not for consequential gains (§ 53). 
R3RUE § 54.  Rescission and Restitution 
(1) A person who has transferred money or other property is entitled 
to recover it by rescission and restitution if 
(a) the transaction is invalid or subject to avoidance for a reason 
identified in another section of this Restatement, and 
(b) the further requirements of this section may be satisfied. 
(2) Rescission requires a mutual restoration and accounting in 
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which each party 
(a) restores property received from the other, to the extent such 
restoration is feasible, 
(b) accounts for additional benefits obtained at the expense of 
the other as a result of the transaction and its subsequent 
avoidance, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, and 
(c) compensates the other for loss from related expenditure as 
justice may require. 
(3) Rescission is limited to cases in which counter-restitution by the 
claimant will restore the defendant to the status quo ante, unless 
(a) the defendant is fairly compensated for any deficiencies in 
the restoration made by the claimant, or 
(b) the fault of the defendant or the assignment of risks in the 
underlying transaction makes it equitable that the defendant 
bear any uncompensated loss. 
(4) Rescission is appropriate when the interests of justice are served 
by allowing the claimant to reverse the challenged transaction 
instead of enforcing it.  As a general rule: 
(a) If the claimant seeks to reverse a transfer induced by fraud 
or other conscious wrongdoing, the limitation described in 
subsection (3) is liberally construed in favor of the claimant. 
(b) If the claimant seeks rescission instead of damages as a 
remedy for material breach of contract (§ 37), the limitation 
described in subsection (3) is employed to prevent injustice to 
the defendant from the reversal of a valid and enforceable 
exchange. 
(c) If rescission would prejudice intervening rights of innocent 
third parties, the remedy will on that account be denied. 
(5) Restitution or a tender of restitution by the claimant is not a 
prerequisite of rescission if affirmative relief to the claimant can be 
reduced by (or made subject to) the claimant’s reciprocal obligation 
of restitution. 
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(6) Prejudicial or speculative delay by the claimant in asserting a 
right of rescission, or a change of circumstances unfairly prejudicial 
to the defendant, justifies denial of the remedy. 
R3RUE § 55.  Constructive Trust 
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to 
identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation of 
the claimant’s rights, the defendant may be declared a constructive 
trustee, for the benefit of the claimant, of the property in question 
and its traceable product. 
(2) The obligation of a constructive trustee is to surrender the 
constructive trust property to the claimant, on such conditions as the 
court may direct. 
R3RUE § 56.  Equitable Lien 
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by a transaction in which 
(a) the claimant’s assets or services are applied to enhance or 
preserve the value of particular property to which the defendant 
has legal title, or more generally 
(b) the connection between unjust enrichment and the 
defendant’s ownership of particular property makes it equitable 
that the claimant have recourse to that property for the 
satisfaction of the defendant’s liability in restitution, 
the claimant may be granted an equitable lien on the property in 
question. 
(2) An equitable lien secures the obligation of the defendant to pay 
the claimant the amount of the defendant’s unjust enrichment as 
separately determined.  Foreclosure of an equitable lien is subject to 
such conditions as the court may direct. 
(3) A claimant who would be entitled to ownership of particular 
property via constructive trust (§ 55) may elect to obtain an 
equitable lien on the property instead. 
(4) The remedy of equitable lien is also a means to restrict the 
claimant’s recovery, in cases where restitution via personal liability 
or constructive trust would exceed limits set by § 50 or § 61. 
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R3RUE § 57.  Subrogation as a Remedy 
(1) If the defendant is unjustly enriched by a transaction in which 
property of the claimant is used to discharge an obligation of the 
defendant or a lien on the defendant’s property, the claimant may 
obtain restitution 
(a) by succeeding to the rights of the obligee or lienor against 
the defendant or the defendant’s property, as though such 
discharge had not occurred, and 
(b) by succeeding to the collateral rights of the defendant in the 
transaction concerned. 
(2) Recovery via subrogation may not exceed reimbursement to the 
claimant. 
(3) The remedy of subrogation may be qualified or withheld when 
necessary to avoid an inequitable result in the circumstances of a 
particular case. 
R3RUE § 59.  Tracing into or Through a Commingled Fund 
(1) If property of the claimant is deposited in a common account or 
otherwise commingled with other property so that it is no longer 
separately identifiable, the traceable product of the claimant’s 
property may be identified in 
(a) the balance of the commingled fund or a portion thereof, or 
(b) property acquired with withdrawals from the commingled 
fund, or a portion thereof, or 
(c) a combination of the foregoing, 
in accordance with the further rules stated in this section. 
(2) If property of the claimant has been commingled by a recipient 
who is a conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary (§ 51) or 
equally at fault in dealing with the claimant’s property (§ 52): 
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(a) Withdrawals that yield a traceable product and withdrawals 
that are dissipated are marshaled so far as possible in favor of 
the claimant. 
(b) Subsequent contributions by the recipient do not restore 
property previously misappropriated from the claimant, unless 
the recipient affirmatively intends such application. 
(c) After one or more withdrawals from a commingled fund, the 
portion of the remainder that may be identified as the traceable 
product of the claimant’s property may not exceed the fund’s 
lowest intermediate balance. 
(3) If property of the claimant has been commingled by an innocent 
recipient (§ 50), the claimant’s property may be traced into the 
remaining balance of the commingled fund and any product thereof 
in the manner permitted by § 59(2), but restitution from property so 
identified may not exceed the amount for which the recipient is 
liable by the rules of §§ 50 and 53. 
R3RUE § 60.  Priority 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by statute and by § 61, a right to 
restitution from identifiable property is superior to the competing 
rights of a creditor of the recipient who is not a bona fide purchaser 
or payee of the property in question.  Acquisition of a judicial lien 
(by attachment, garnishment, judgment, execution, or the like) does 
not make the lien creditor a purchaser of the property subject to lien. 
(2) Priority between a restitution claimant and a third-party 
purchaser or payee is determined by the rules of §§ 66–67. 
(3) A claimant who is entitled to restitution but who is unable to 
identify specific property from which restitution is available has a 
remedy via money judgment that ranks equally with the claims of 
general creditors. 
R3RUE § 63.  Equitable Disqualification (Unclean Hands) 
Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant would be 
entitled may be limited or denied because of the claimant’s 
inequitable conduct in the transaction that is the source of the 
asserted liability. 
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R3RUE § 66.  Bona Fide Purchaser
A purchaser for value and without notice acquires the legal interest 
that the grantor holds and purports to convey, free of equitable 
interests that a restitution claimant might have asserted against the 
property in the hands of the grantor. 
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